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 To date, research studies have found only mild support for classic deterrence 
theory with the greatest support for increased certainty, little support for increased 
severity, and scant research on the effect of increased celerity.  Much of this prior 
literature has used scenario-based data, relied heavily on student samples, and explored 
rule breaking behavior over relatively short time periods.  Finally, the slow pace of 
punishment within the criminal justice system potentially reduces any existing deterrent 
effect of the certainty and severity of punishment.  This dissertation seeks to address 
these limitations of prior deterrence studies by using 13 years of data (2000-2012) from 
the National Football League consisting of rule breakers who are punished with penalties 
and monetary fines almost immediately upon discovery of the infraction. 
 The main question driving this research is whether there is evidence of general 
deterrence.  Specifically, this dissertation seeks to determine whether prior punishment 
reduces current rule-breaking behavior.  To address this question, this research explores 
the effect of on-field penalties and post-game fines on behavior within the National 
Football League at both the league and team levels.  The dataset has several rare 
 
 
characteristics including: large variety and detail in the types of punishment administered, 
an opportunity to directly observe the effect of punishment, the near immediate 
imposition of punishment, and the transmission of almost perfect information about 
punishment.  
 The primary finding is that there is no evidence of general deterrence in the 
National Football League, independent of control variables.  Specifically, penalties and 
fines do not appear to prevent future rule breaking behavior.  In general, when controlling 
for particular seasons, opponents, or the record of a team, the effects of penalties and 
fines loose significance and approach zero.  The different controls for seasons, 
opponents, or record are fairly consistent in their statistical significance for all penalties 
and violent penalties, although it appears that violent penalties vary less according to 
these outside factors than all types of penalties.  In sum, this dissertation finds no 
evidence that punishment affects future rule-breaking behavior at either the team or 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
Sports, just like societies, have rules that are meant to guide behavior.  The 
National Football League (NFL) is a prime example of this with a 120-page rule book 
intended to control the actions of 1,696 players and 32 head coaches (Goodell, 2012).  
These rules encompass a variety of areas from promoting sportsmanship (prohibiting 
excessive celebration) to ensuring the safety of players (prohibiting unnecessary 
roughness) all with the intention of producing certain behavior within the league.  Each 
of these rules has sanctions that vary depending on the severity of the act.  The 
punishments include an award of a first down to the opposing team, loss of a down, 
yardage penalty (5-15 yards), disqualification, suspension, and fines ranging from $75 to 
$500,000.  From 2000 to 2012, there were 50,067 penalties committed within the NFL 
(“Armchair Analysis”).  It is the use of these rules, sanctions, and the intentions of the 
sanctions that make the NFL a particularly powerful comparison to justice systems.  Like 
the NFL, the regulatory and criminal justice systems have rules and laws to guide 
behavior and these laws are enforced by police officers or regulators (referees in the 
NFL).  While the most severe punishments in the NFL are less severe than the most 
severe punishments in the criminal justice system (i.e. there is no death penalty or life 
imprisonment) there is similar variation in severity and type of punishment.  The criminal 
justice system, regulatory justice system, and the NFL rest on the assumption that 
punishment deters rule breaking behavior and therefore they rely heavily on the tenets of 
deterrence theory: punishment that is swift, certain, and severe will prevent future crime 
(Beccaria, 1764; Gibbs, 1975; Nagin, 1998; Zimring and Hawkins, 1973).   
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This research utilizes the detailed and long term nature of NFL data to explore the 
effect of punishment on rule infractions.  While some research has explored this question 
within the criminal justice system, sports, and the regulatory justice system, this research 
will expand on existing research by using longitudinal data with punishments that are 
enforced more swiftly than punishment within the criminal justice or regulatory justice 
systems.  On-field punishment within the NFL can be compared to both the criminal 
justice system and the regulatory justice system.  The comparison to the regulatory justice 
system is relevant because it uses group punishment for individual action (i.e., collective 
accountability) that is often conducted for the benefit of the corporation within a 
professionalized environment (Braithwaite, 1984).  In addition, similar to the on-field 
behavior of NFL players, white collar rule breaking is often supported by the corporation 
(Coleman, 2005).  Even though the regulatory justice system is an apt comparison, the 
criminal justice system is being used as a comparison in this dissertation for two primary 
reasons.  First, the decision-making process of football players on the field is likely more 
similar to that of street criminals.  It is typically a fast decision, made under constraints of 
the game, with strong emotions and visceral states.  This process is similar to street 
criminal decision-making described by Loewenstein and colleagues (1997) and Katz 
(1988): a criminal decision is likely to involve “the arousal of powerful emotions such as 
fear, excitement, lust, anger” (Lowenstein et al., 1997, p. 444) and is a “sensual 
phenomenon” (Katz, 1988, p.4).   Regulatory crimes, on the other hand, are hypothesized 
to be a more deliberative process in part because the culture of a corporation often 
rewards well thought out, rational decisions (Shover and Hochstetler, 2006).   
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The second reason this dissertation is using a comparison to the criminal justice 
system is because the population of NFL players is more similar to the typical street 
criminal population in terms of age and race.  The average age of the NFL player is 25 
years old (espn.go.com, 2003) and the groups with the highest rate of arrests within the 
general population are 18-24 year olds (Snyder and Mulako-Wangota, 2014).  White 
collar criminals, on the other hand, are slightly older: the average age of onset has been 
reported as 35 and the average age of last arrest, 43 (Weisburd and Waring, 2001).  In 
addition, the average age of a white collar crime offender has been reported to be 40 
years old (Benson and Simpson, 2009).   
The races of NFL players are also more similar to that of street criminals than 
white collar criminals.  The NFL is made up of primarily non-white players.  Only 29% 
of active players surveyed in 2007 were white, 65% were African-American, 3% Asian, 
2% other, and 1% Hispanic (Rhoden, 2008).  White collar crime, on the hand, is tied to 
opportunity to commit white collar crime, which results in an offender that is typically 
white and male (Benson and Simpson, 2009).  In sum, while both the regulatory and 
criminal justice systems are strong comparisons to the punishment system within the 
NFL, the criminal justice system will be used in this dissertation due to the similarities in 
decision-making processes, age, and race.   
 Both Beccaria (1764) and Bentham (1789) provide the roots of deterrence theory.  
The theory that stems from their ideas posits that for punishment to prevent future crime 
it should be swift, certain, and severe.  Research on deterrence theory has gone through 
many stages throughout history starting with a focus on the death penalty (e.g. Sellin, 
1959).  In the late 1960s and early 1970s, deterrence research focused on objective 
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deterrence, or the effect of actual punishment on crime (e.g. Chiricos and Waldo, 1970).  
The next stage of deterrence research focused on offenders’ perceptions of punishment 
both in cross sectional and panel studies (e.g. Gibbs, 1968; Saltzman et al., 1982) and 
most recently, research has been scenario based and combined deterrence theory as a part 
of rational choice theory (e.g. Loughran et al., 2011a).   
In addition to focusing on objective and perceptual deterrence, deterrence 
research has focused on the effect of specific policies, laws, or programs.  For example 
there is research on increases in police expenditures, changing numbers of police officers, 
and changes in police tactics (e.g. Eck and Maguire, 2000; Evans and Owens, 2007; 
Koper, 1995; Levitt, 1997; Marvell and Moody, 1996; Sherman and Weisburd, 1995), 
incarceration (e.g. Spelman, 2000), three strikes laws (e.g. Zimring, Hawkins, and 
Kamin, 2001), gun laws (e.g. Kennedy, 2008), and deterrence within the regulatory 
justice system (e.g. Simpson and Koper, 1992).  In sum, prior deterrence literature has 
found that the increased certainty of punishment decreases crime while the increased 
severity of punishment has virtually no effect on crime.  The recent criminological 
research on deterrence theory using scenario based data, and relying heavily on student 
samples is an improvement over past research by attempting to parse out causality of 
experiences, perceptions of punishment, and behavior, but it does not explore objective 
deterrence using longitudinal data comprised of people committing rule violations.  This 
dissertation will do just that, expand on prior deterrence research by exploring objective 
deterrence using longitudinal data comprised of individuals breaking rules. 
This research uses play-by-play and fine data from the NFL over the years 2000-
2012 in order to study repeated rule infractions over time within a closely monitored 
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setting.  While the connection between football and the criminal and regulatory justice 
systems may not be immediately apparent, this dataset provides a particularly unique 
environment in which to observe rule breaking, sanctions, and subsequent behavior.  
There are four main reasons football is a particularly useful environment to observe 
deterrence.  First, a football game, season, and football career provide a closed system to 
observe rule breaking behavior that we would not be able to observe with the same detail 
for crimes on the street.  In any given football game, multiple players break multiple rules 
with multiple different sanctions.  These sanctions differ by the severity of the yardage 
penalty imposed and whether a post-game fine is imposed.  Second, the direct effect of 
punishment is more easily observed without the complication of the black box of prison 
(or arrest).  This is an improvement over many criminal justice studies that struggle to 
differentiate between different competing effects, like deterrence and incapacitation 
(Levitt, 2004).  Third, football penalties address one of the criticisms levied by past 
research; punishment may not have the strong deterrent effect that is expected because it 
is not imposed quickly enough (Paternoster, 2010).  In most cases in football, the 
punishment is enforced immediately after the infraction.  This allows certainty and 
severity to be observed with celerity held constant.  To be clear, celerity is not explored 
in this dissertation.  Instead, because the speed at which penalties are enforced is the 
same for all on field rule infractions, certainty and severity can be explored without 
complicating the relationship with the timing of punishment.  Finally, football is an 
environment in which there is almost a perfect transfer of information about the rules and 
punishments to the players.  While this does not remove players’ perceptions of celerity, 
certainty, and severity, it likely gets perceptions of punishment as close as possible to 
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objective punishment.  For example, with the recent crackdown on helmet to helmet hits, 
newspaper articles were written about the crackdown (e.g. Battista, 2010), a memo was 
sent to teams from the NFL commissioner, players were shown a video in order to put 
them “on notice” (Anderson, 2010), and several large fines were levied early on in the 
crackdown that all players were made aware of.  It would be hard to argue that all players 
did not know about this new increased enforcement.  Granted, this particular rule had a 
unique amount of publicity, but it is likely that all rule changes are told to players at least 
at a higher rate than new laws are passed on to citizens.  In many ways, football is very 
comparable to that which Beccaria was calling for in 1764: the punishment is swift, 
certain, proportionately severe, and laws are accessible. 
Other researchers have used sports to explore interesting topics like labor 
migration (Horowitz and McDaniel, 2013) corruption (Duggan and Levitt, 2002), and 
writing software (Munasinghe et al. 2001).  The literature argues that sporting events are 
controlled economic environments and real world laboratories that result in highly 
reliable data (McCormick and Tollison, 1984; Moskowitz and Wertheim, 2011; Togler, 
2009).  Given the precedent of applying sports to non-sports topics, it is not surprising 
that sports have also been used to research criminological issues.  The literature on sports 
and criminology can be divided into literature on deviance and deterrence.  The deviance 
literature describes deviance and attempts to put deviance within a theoretical framework, 
but does not specifically explore prevention (e.g. Blackshaw and Crabbe, 2004; Eitzen, 
1981; Luschen, 1980).  Deviance is split into within-game deviance (e.g. violent behavior 
or code breaking) and out-of-game deviance including criminal behavior, sex scandals, 
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gambling, and performance enhancing drugs (Atkinson and Young, 2008; Delany and 
Madigan, 2009; Duggan and Levitt, 2002).   
In addition to the theoretically focused deviance literature, there is sports 
literature specifically related to deterrence.  The deterrence and sports literature focuses 
on outside of the game and within-game behavior.  Research on behavior outside of the 
game has explored performance enhancing drugs and NCAA rule infractions (Cullen, 
Latessa, and Jonson, 2012; Strelan and Boeckmann, 2006).  The literature that studies 
within-game behavior explores the effect of policing by questioning the effect of 
certainty through referees (Allen, 2002; Heckelman and Yates, 2003; Levitt, 2002; 
McCormick and Tollison, 1984).  Finally, most relevant, Witt (2005) researched the 
effect of an increase in the severity of a rule change within the English Premier League 
(soccer).  This research is particularly informative because it found that, based on a rule 
change, there is a displacement of fouls from more serious red card penalties to less 
serious no card or yellow card penalties.  This was a macro level study looking at the 
overall number of fouls across the entire league for two seasons.  The data in this 
dissertation will be able to expand upon this research by providing data over 13 years.     
 This research, like all deterrence research, is policy relevant.  Since football is a 
closed system with almost complete information, if this research does not find support for 
deterrence theory, it raises questions about support for deterrence theory within the 
criminal justice system.  On the other hand, if there is support for deterrence theory, it 
will suggest that the criminal justice system may not be properly exploiting people’s 
rationality (Paternoster, 2010). Therefore, if there is support, this research will suggest 
that it will be worthwhile to explore more fully, when, why and how the mechanisms for 
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deterrence work within football with hopes of conveying the lessons learned in football to 
the criminal justice system. 
 In sum, football provides an opportunity to study deterrence theory using 
longitudinal data within a closed, closely observed system.  Specifically, this dissertation 
explores general deterrence.  This dissertation will start by describing the history of 
deterrence theory and research conducted on deterrence theory.  Next, this dissertation 
will review the connection between sports and criminology, and finally, it will conclude 




CHAPTER 2: DETERRENCE THEORY 
 
The use of penalties and fines in the NFL assumes that punishment prevents rule 
breaking and thus invokes deterrence theory.  This section will review the deterrence 
literature.  Several reviews have been published that are comprehensive and well-
organized, therefore this section covers much of the same ground (Nagin, 1998; Nagin, 
2013; Paternoster, 2010).  The framework for this review is as follows: deterrence theory 
will be defined, next the empirical development of deterrence theory will be discussed, 
and finally empirical research on specific policies and practices will be reviewed.  
 
HISTORY 
 The roots of deterrence theory begin with the writings of Cesare Beccaria (1764) 
and Jeremy Bentham (1789).  In the 1700s, punishment within the ancient régimes was 
harsh and unevenly enforced.  Both Beccaria (1764) and Bentham (1789) attempted to 
describe a system that would be more rational, predictable, and therefore, more efficient 
than the contemporary systems in which they were writing (Italy and England), but also a 
system that would prevent people from committing future crimes.  Beccaria (1764) 
established the touch points of a basic framework, while Bentham (1789) presented a 
more developed theory.  Both writings fall within the classical school of thought by 
positing that people are self-interested and rational, and therefore will seek out pleasure 
and avoid pain.  The classical school asserts that if the pain of punishment is effectively 
enforced, people will forgo the pleasures of crime in order to avoid the pain of 
punishment.  For Beccaria (1764), effective punishment is swift, certain, and just severe 
enough to prevent crime.  He wrote that punishment should not be excessively harsh (as it 
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was at the time), but instead should be proportionate to the crime that was committed.  In 
addition to describing effective punishment, Beccaria (1764) suggested other reforms 
including educating would-be criminals (as a prevention method) and enacting laws that 
were clearly written and accessible to all.  When discussing punishment, Beccaria (1764) 
focused on state imposed punishment.  Bentham (1789), on the other hand, focused on 
the more abstract costs or pains.  Bentham’s costs and pains included legal punishments, 
but also included informal costs.  Each writer was the inspiration for different theories: 
Bentham’s (1789) notion of utility and use of informal costs led to rational choice theory 
and Beccaria’s (1764) use of state punishment led to deterrence theory.   
 After Beccaria (1764) and Bentham (1789), discussion of punishment based 
theories largely fell out of favor as the field moved toward the positivist school with 
Lombroso (1876) and Hooton (1939).  During this time of decline for deterrence theory 
there was some research on the death penalty (e.g. Sellin, 1959), but deterrence research 
did not did not gain popularity again until the late 1960s with articles from Becker (1968) 
and Gibbs (1968).  These writings coincided with a growth in crime rates, an increase in 
availability of technology, and improved statistics (Nagin, 2013).  Becker (1968), an 
economist who drew from Bentham (1789) claimed that because people are rational and 
self-interested, criminal behavior can be understood just like any other economic 
decision-making: there are costs and benefits that can be manipulated to guide decisions.  
Becker (1968) hypothesized that certainty was more important than severity to change 
behavior.   
 Gibbs (1968), on the other hand, drew more from Beccaria’s (1764) work by 
focusing only on punishment as opposed to the costs and benefits of the expected 
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utility/rational choice models of Bentham and Becker (1968).  Gibbs (1968) specifically 
looked at certainty and severity and was the first to empirically test deterrence theory 
(more detail about this research below).  Becker (1968) and Gibbs (1968) were the first in 
a line of research exploring the effect of punishment on crime.  Before discussing the 
development of the research and theory, this section will define deterrence theory. 
 
DETERRENCE THEORY DEFINED 
 As mentioned above, deterrence theory posits that people are self-interested and 
rational (Becker, 1968; Bentham, 1789; Gibbs, 1968).  Therefore, in order for 
punishment to be effective at preventing crime it should exploit this rationality by 
increasing the certainty of apprehension and costs of punishment.  The simplest stating of 
the deterrence hypothesis, almost directly from Beccaria (1764) is that when there is 
greater certainty, severity, or celerity, there should be a lower crime rate (Paternoster, 
2010).  The effect of punishment within deterrence theory is split into two different types 
of deterrence: objective and perceptual deterrence.  Objective deterrence refers to 
punishment that is actually enforced, for example, arrests or imprisonment.  Research 
exploring objective punishment assumes that people have knowledge of state punishment 
and that they internalize that knowledge, i.e., they know how likely it is that they will be 
arrested or imprisoned (Paternoster, 2010).   
Perceptual deterrence, on the other hand, explores people’s perceptions of 
punishment.  For example, what a person thinks the likelihood of arrest is for driving 
drunk.  Researchers have been discussing the link between objective and perceptual 
deterrence for many years.  For example, as early as 1975, Gibbs recognized the 
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importance of determining the relationship between objective deterrence and perceptual 
deterrence.  Despite the early acknowledgement of this connection, there is little literature 
that has found that the connection is strong.  This literature will be reviewed in more 
detail below.  The addition of perceptual deterrence allows for three more nuanced 
hypotheses of deterrence theory. 
 
H1: Other things being equal, there should be an inverse relationship between the 
objective properties of punishment (certainty, severity, celerity) and the crime 
rate. 
 
H2: Other things being equal, there should be a positive relationship between the 
objective properties of punishment (certainty, severity, celerity) and the 
perceptual properties. 
 
H3: Other things being equal, there should be an inverse relationship between the 
perceptual properties of punishment (certainty, severity, celerity) and measures of 
criminal offending. (Paternoster, 2010, p. 786) 
 
Objective and perceptual deterrence can be further broken down into two categories: 
general deterrence and specific deterrence.  General deterrence is the threat of 
punishment that all people feel (Nagin, 2013).  People generally know that they may be 
arrested if they drive drunk even if all people rate the risk of being caught slightly 
differently.  Examples of measures of general deterrence include the effect of the number 
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of police on crime rates, the effect of a three strikes law on crime rates, or the effect of 
penalties on foul commission in football.  Specific deterrence is an individual’s own 
experience with punishment (Nagin, 2013).  If a person offends and is caught, the 
experience of being caught will inform any future decisions to offend.  Traditionally 
general deterrence was only relevant for those who had never committed a crime and 
specific deterrence was only relevant for those who had experience with punishment 
(Paternoster and Piquero, 1995).  Also, punishment had to occur for both general and 
specific deterrence (Paternoster and Piquero, 1995).   
The traditional view of general and specific deterrence changed with a 
reconceptualization of deterrence theory by Stafford and Warr in 1993.  Stafford and 
Warr (1993) suggested that people can experience both general and specific deterrence 
and that in addition to punishment experience, punishment avoidance is also important to 
the deterrence model.  This reconceptualization of deterrence theory fits with the above 
hypotheses as follows: if a person has a direct or indirect experience with punishment it 
will decrease the likelihood of future criminal offenses and if a person has a direct or 
indirect experience with punishment avoidance, then it will increase future rule breaking 
behavior (Stafford and Warr, 1993).   
Research on deterrence theory has gone through many stages including objective 
deterrence, perceptual deterrence, and finally a stage in which much research is scenario-
based and overlaps with behavioral economics and rational choice research.  The next 
section of this chapter will review the research in each of these stages of research and 





 The early objective deterrence studies explored the effect of sanctions on crime 
rates using official data.  Gibbs (1968) was the first researcher to empirically test 
objective deterrence.  To explore objective deterrence, he used the aggregate number of 
admissions to state prison and the number of homicides known to police.  He found 
support for objective deterrence: the greater the certainty and severity of punishment, the 
fewer homicides there were.  The effect was greater for certainty than severity.  As 
mentioned above, Gibbs’ (1968) research was the beginning of a large number of 
deterrence studies.  This section will review briefly some of the other research conducted 
during this time on objective deterrence. 
 Tittle (1969), using the same data that Gibbs (1968) used (official data and 
national prison statistics) found that there is a tipping point for certainty: certainty has an 
effect on crime, but only when it is above a certain point.  He extended prior research by 
including different types of crime and controls for urbanization, age, race, education, and 
sex.  Next, Chiricos and Waldo (1970) reanalyzed Tittle’s (1969) data at three points in 
time and found that the relationship between police sanctions and imprisonment may 
have been spurious.  They found no evidence for a severity effect and suggested that the 
certainty effect could be an effect of police reporting.  They suggested that aggregate data 
was not the best way to look at deterrence, instead proposing that researchers use 
individual-level data.  
 Near the end of the objective deterrence stage of research, two different reviews 
were published on deterrence: 1) The National Academy of Science Report (Blumstein, 
Cohen, and Nagin, 1978) and 2) Cook (1980).  Both reviews found that the criminal 
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justice system did have a deterrence effect although the National Academy of Science 
Report was more guarded and tentative about the findings than Cook (1980) was.  At this 
point, researchers recognized that the data were not particularly strong, individual level 
data would be more effective, and that perceptions may play a part in deterrence.  These 
findings led to shift to a new era of perceptual deterrence research. 
 
OBJECTIVE AND PERCEPTUAL DETERRENCE CONNECTION 
Research on objective deterrence assumes that there is a relationship between the 
sanctions that are enforced and what individuals perceive those sanctions to be.  There 
have been several studies that have explored this connection.  According to an Assembly 
Committee on Criminal Procedure in California (California Legislature, 1968), only 
about ¼ of the sample was able to correctly identify what the maximum punishment was 
for certain crimes.  Not surprisingly, incarcerated people had a greater knowledge of 
punishment: 62% of the incarcerated sample knew what the punishment was for certain 
crimes.  Williams, Gibbs, and Erickson (1980) explored perceptions more explicitly in a 
survey of 2,400 adults in Arizona.  They found that while people’s perceptions do appear 
to be positively related to the actual punishments, they seem more influenced by what 
they perceive punishments ought to be as opposed to what punishments actually are (see 
also Williams and Gibbs, 1981).  Johnston, O’Malley, and Bachman (1981) suggested 
that the particular time period may affect individual’s knowledge of laws.  In a study 
using the Monitoring the Future data, they found that about 10-20% of people in states 
where jail was not legally used as punishment for marijuana use thought it was an option, 
and in states where jail was an option, about 30-40% believed that it was not an option.  
As evidence of the importance of the time period, it appeared that people were more 
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accurate in their estimation of the punishment when it was closer in time to the changing 
of a marijuana law (decriminalization).  
Grube and Kearney (1983) found that about 60% of the 238 respondents in a 
phone survey knew of a newly imposed mandatory jail sentence for drunk driving.  Kleck 
et al. (2005) directly explored the connection between perceptions of punishment and 
actual punishment in a telephone survey with 1,500 people in 54 counties.  They found 
that perceptions had no significant relationship with actual punishment.  MacCoun et al. 
(2009), updated Johnston et al.’s (1981) research by using the National Surveys on Drug 
Use and Health from 2001-2003 and found that the same amount of the sample (1/3) 
believe that jail is a punishment for marijuana use, regardless of whether it is a 
punishment in their respective states.  Similar to the California Assembly (California 
Legislature, 1968), they found that experience with punishment improves this estimation: 
a person who had experience with the marijuana law was 72% more likely to think that 
jail was not an option when it was not.  In sum, the research connecting objective 
punishment and perceptions is varied.  At best, the research finds that over 50% of the 
population has fairly accurate perceptions of punishment and at worst, there is no 
connection at all between perceptions and actual punishment.  This is a gap in deterrence 
research that deserves more attention. 
 
PERCEPTUAL DETERRENCE 
 Perceptual deterrence research focuses on the perceptions people have of 
punishment: instead of the actual arrest rate, for example, it explores what people think 
the likelihood of being arrested is.  By the nature of what is being measured, this research 
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is primarily survey data that started out cross-sectionally, and over time expanded to 
panel data sets.  The surveys generally asked respondents about self-reported criminal 
behavior or the intent to commit criminal behavior.  Both cross-sectional research and 
longitudinal research had assumptions about perceptions.  Cross-sectional surveys 
assumed that perceptions and criminal behavior were associated, but did not determine 
whether perceptions affected behavior or behavior affected perceptions.  Most 
longitudinal research did address causality, but still assumed that perceptions were 
constant over time and did not allow for updating of perceptions.   
 Waldo and Chiricos (1972) were some of the first researchers to explore 
perceptual deterrence using individual level data.  They interviewed undergraduates 
about whether the undergraduates themselves would commit a crime and whether 
someone else would commit the crime.  Using survey data, they explored the effect of 
certainty and severity on crimes they labeled as mala in se and mala prohibita.  Mala in se 
acts are considered inherently bad and in this research are operationalized as theft.  Mala 
prohibita, on the other hand, are acts that are only bad because they are prohibited and in 
this case they are operationalized as drug use.  This research found that certainty matters.  
It matters more for mala prohibita than mala in se and the deterrent effect is different for 
different people and different crimes.    
 Grasmick and Bryjak (1980) explored perceptual deterrence as it relates to 
severity.  They argue that until this point severity had not been measured correctly and 
therefore they refined the measurement.  Their refinement of severity did not assume that 
each individual had the same perception of severity for a particular punishment and 
instead allowed the perception of severity to vary by asking how large of a problem the 
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punishment would create for that person.  With this refined measure of severity, 
Grasmick and Bryjak (1980) found a negative relationship between severity and self-
reported behavior: increasing severity decreased self-reported behavior.  
Paternoster and colleagues (1982) studied perceptual deterrence using panel 
research.  They explained that the variations in the findings of prior research were due to 
different measures of perceived risk, different types of punishment, and different 
analytical techniques.  To improve upon prior studies, they conducted a survey of 300 
college students over 3 years on involvement in delinquent acts, perceptions of risk, and 
consequences of punishment in order to explore perceived risk more thoroughly.  The 
panel design of this study improved upon prior research and allowed perceptions to vary 
over time.  In this research, they found evidence of what they called an “experiential” 
effect, the effect of behavior on perceptions.  
 The recognition of the experiential effect highlighted the need for panel research 
designs and most research following Paternoster et al. (1982) used that design.  Using the 
same sample as Paternoster et al. (1982), Saltzman and colleagues (1982) looked 
specifically at the experiential effect.  They explored this effect with minor crime such as 
petty theft, marijuana use, and bad checks.  They found that perceptions do vary over 
time and as Paternoster et al. (1982) found, that the relationship between perceptions and 
behavior appears to be reciprocal.  In the reciprocal relationship, the effect of behavior on 
perceptions appears to be greater than the effect of perceptions on behavior. 
 In a review of the literature from 1972-1986, Paternoster (1987) sums up the 
deterrence findings to this point.  He highlights the experiential effect and the necessity 
of using panel data, and the need for control variables.  Cross-sectional research does 
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provide support for deterrence theory, but Paternoster (1987) suggests that this is likely a 
spurious relationship: when employing correct methods to address causality and 
spuriousness, the inverse relationship between certainty and severity and behavior 
disappears.  This article suggests that deterrence literature up to this point is not 
promising and proposes that future research should be done with adult samples with high 
rates of offending.  Paternoster (1987) also suggests that even with better samples and 
better methods, the results of deterrence research may not be promising.  He suggests that 
people may not be as rational as we suspect.  It is this concern that leads to the next stage 
of research that begins to explore how rational people are and what the limitations to this 
rationality is by merging deterrence theory with rational choice theory and bringing in 
behavioral economics and cognitive psychology. 
 
SCENARIO BASED RESEARCH AND ELABORATIONS 
 In the next stage of deterrence research, theoretical changes were made to 
deterrence to add benefits and informal sanctions to the model (e.g. Nagin and Pogarsky, 
2001).  With these additions, the line between deterrence theory and rational choice 
theory all but disappeared with research conducted in this area addressing both theories.  
Research has also changed to be primarily scenario-based research, allowing researchers 
more specificity about situations that they are studying (e.g. would you use marijuana in 
your house versus someone else’s house).   
 As Paternoster (1987) suggested, much of this research is exploring how rational 
people are and what some of the limitations to rationality might be.  A particular line of 
research looks at individual differences, specifically focusing on visceral states such as 
arousal.  For example, Loewenstein and colleagues (1997) found that sexual arousal 
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increased a person’s likelihood of perceiving themselves to act in a sexually aggressive 
way.  This suggests that individual differences or visceral states may affect a person’s 
rational decision making.   
 Other current research has focused on the limitations of rationality.  For example, 
Loughran and several other researchers have explored the effect of ambiguity, anticipated 
regret, prospect theory, and time discounting (Anwar and Loughran, 2011; Loughran et 
al., 2011a, Loughran et al., 2011b; Loughran et al., 2012).  To briefly summarize these 
findings, individuals do increase their estimations of the probability of being caught after 
being arrested (Anwar and Loughran, 2011).  The effect of certainty is not linear, there is 
an approximate tipping point of .3.  Below .3 there is no relationship between certainty 
and offending, but above increased certainty is related to a decrease in offending 
(Loughran et al., 2011b).  People are ambiguity averse for decisions with losses such as 
arrest (Loughran et al., 2011a).  Finally, people do have hyperbolic time preferences: 
people prefer immediate to delayed reward and this tendency increases as the time period 
to reward gets shorter (Loughran et al., 2012).  This research speaks to when and how 
people are rational and what might affect their decision-making processes.  As deterrence 
theory suggests, punishment may affect this calculus, but there is more than just 
punishment in these theoretical models.  This recent literature attempts to address past 
limitations and move deterrence theory in a direction that may determine why, when, and 
for whom deterrence theory works.  This dissertation will not be focusing on individual 




POLICY EVAULATIONS AND OTHER APPLICATIONS 
 Deterrence research includes another line of research that explores the effect of 
certain policies on criminal or rule-breaking behavior.  This research could be included in 
the chronological history of deterrence research, but the studies below are useful when 
taken as a whole exploring a particular policy or program.  Research that is most relevant 
to deterrence explores the effect of police, imprisonment, certain legislative acts like 
sentence enhancements, and deterrence within the regulatory justice system.  This section 
will review the literature on each of these areas of policy. 
 Research on the police can generally be split into two categories: 1) expenditures 
on police and 2) police strategy.  The next sections will discuss each of these areas 
separately.   
 
Expenditures on Police 
 The body of literature studying the effect of police expenditures primarily focuses 
on the impact that increasing the number of police officers has on the certainty portion of 
the deterrence hypothesis.  While this dissertation is not concerned with an increase in the 
number of “police” on the football field (referees), it is important to understand current 
knowledge of the effect that increased certainty has on rule breaking behavior because 
the effectiveness of certainty is applicable to the effectiveness of sanctions.  Therefore, 
this section summarizes the literature addressing expenditures on the police.  Much of the 
literature is plagued by methodological limitations.  Specifically, the problem of making 
a clean causal inference is evident in many studies.  For example, literature on police 
expenditures struggles with determining whether an increase in crime causes an increase 
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in the number of police or vice versa.  Despite these limitations, there is a large body of 
literature exploring the effect of the police and much of the literature attempts to address 
these limitations.  This section will review the literature and the implications this research 
has for deterrence theory, and thus implications for sanctioning within the NFL.   
 Wilson and Boland (1978) were the first to study the effect of the number of 
police officers on crime.  Specifically, they looked at the number of patrol units on the 
street and the number of moving citations in 35 cities on robbery rates.  This research, as 
with all research exploring the effect of the numbers of police, assumes that police 
officers deter crime by a threat of greater certainty.  Wilson and Boland (1978) found that 
there was a relationship between resources and activity of the police and the robbery rate, 
thus finding support for deterrence. 
 More recently, two studies attempted to address methodological limitations of 
past research (Levitt, 1997; Marvell and Moody, 1996).   Marvell and Moody (1996) 
used the Granger Causality Test to explore the effect of the number of police officers per 
capita in 49 states and 56 large cities from 1973-1992 on serious felony crime rates.  At 
the state level, there was a significant negative relationship between the number of police 
officers and homicide, robbery, and burglary rates.  At the city level, the same effect was 
found for total crimes, homicide, burglary, larceny, and auto theft.  Specifically, for each 
additional officer, at the state level there was a reduction of about four crimes and at the 
city level, there was a reduction of about 24 crimes.  Levitt (1997) also addressed 
methodological limitations of past studies by using electoral cycles as an instrumental 
variable.  Using this instrumental variable he explored the effect of the number of police 
officers per capita in 59 US cities from 1970-1992 on serious felony crime rates.  Police 
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reduced crime by 5-8% depending on the type of crime.  The effect of the police was 
greater for violent crime than for property crime (for a critique see McCrary, 2002).  
These two studies provide support for deterrence theory with methods to address 
simultaneity.  
 Eck and Maguire (2000) reviewed the literature on the police up until 2000.  Out 
of 41 studies, Eck and Maguire (2000) found only nine studies methodologically rigorous 
enough to draw conclusions.  Based on these nine studies, Eck and Maguire (2000) 
concluded that the police had no independent or consistent effect on the crime drop in the 
1990s and therefore police research did not support deterrence theory. 
 Despite the negative findings of Eck and Maguire (2000), researchers continued 
to study the effect of police while trying to increase the methodological quality of the 
research on this issue (Corman and Mocan, 2000; Evans and Owens, 2007; Levitt, 2004).  
Corman and Mocan (2000) researched the effect of the number of police officers and the 
number of arrests in New York City from 1970 to 1996 on serious felony crime rates 
including murder, robbery, burglary, and motor vehicle theft.  They found support for 
deterrence theory: robberies and burglaries had a negative relationship with the number 
of police officers and murder, robbery, burglary, and motor vehicle theft all had a 
significant negative relationship with the arrest rate for each type of crime. 
 Levitt, in an empirical analysis (2002) and a review of the literature (2004), found 
further support that numbers of police officers have an effect on crime.  In his 2002 
analysis, Levitt used the number of firefighters and civil service workers as an 
instrumental variable to explore the effect of the number of police on violent and property 
crimes in 122 cities from 1975 to 1995.  He found that the number of police officers 
23 
 
reduced the violent and property crime rate by approximately 5%.  In Levitt’s (2004) 
review, he found similar results: an increase in the number of police officers in the 1990s 
of about 14% resulted in about a 5-6% reduction in crime.  Therefore, the police 
accounted for between 1/5th and 1/10th of the overall drop in crime in the 1990s. 
 In 1994, President Clinton passed a crime bill authorizing funding with the goal of 
putting 100,000 more officers on the streets by 2000 (The Department of Justice, 1994).  
Evans and Owens (2007) explored the effect of new hires that resulted from this bill in 
2,074 cities from 1990-2001.  They found that the additional officers had a statistically 
significant negative relationship with auto thefts, burglaries, robberies, and aggravated 
assaults rates. 
 There are two studies that explored the effect of a reduction of the police force or 
a decrease in police action instead of an increase (DeAngelo and Hansen, 2008; Shi, 
2009).  These two studies have the reverse hypothesis: as posited by deterrence theory, a 
decrease in the number of officers will decrease certainty and therefore crime will 
increase.  DeAngelo and Hansen (2008) explored the reduction of police officers with a 
massive layoff in the Oregon State police department.  They found that the reduction of 
police was related to a 10-20% increase in injuries and fatalities on highways.  Shi (2009) 
exploited a situation in Cincinnati in which officers lowered their use of arrest due to a 
class action law suit, federal civil rights investigation, and indictment of an officer for 
shooting and killing an unarmed African-American.  Although this did not change the 
number of police, it had the same effect: decreasing the certainty of arrest.  A decrease in 




Finally, there is some evidence counter to the supportive findings of the empirical 
articles discussed thus far.  Reaves and Hickman (2002) and Zimring (2007) provide 
descriptive data that is contrary to deterrence theory.  In a Bureau of Justice Statistics 
report, Reaves and Hickman (2002) illustrate that between 1990 and 2000 some cities 
actually saw an increase police and an increase in crime.  Zimring (2007) discussed the 
effects of crime in Canada during the same time period that the United States had a large 
crime drop.  Canada had a similar crime drop to the United States, but decreased the 
number of police officers they had during this time, suggesting that the police are not 
responsible for the crime drop.   
 In sum, there is evidence in support of police expenditures on crime, and thus 
support for deterrence theory and specifically, the certainty hypothesis of deterrence 
theory.  Questions remain about how much of an effect there is and how this effect 
occurs.  It is likely that what the officers are doing may determine how large of an effect 
they have.  The next section will explore the effectiveness of police strategies that invoke 
deterrence theory.  
 
Police Strategy 
 Police strategy evaluations look at specific programs or strategies the police are 
involved in instead of only the numbers of police officers.  Some policing strategies are 
more relevant to deterrence theory because they are intended to increase certainty and in 
some cases celerity and severity.  The strategies that will be focused on here are hot spots 
policing, policing focused on small high crime areas (Sherman and Weisburd, 1995) and 
pulling-levers policing, a strategy that selects a particular problem and uses all potential 
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mechanisms to sanction the groups involved in the selected problem (Kennedy, 2006).  
As Zimring (2007) mentioned, in many cases it is hard to disentangle the effects of 
particular programs because often many changes in policing are happening at the same 
time.  Nevertheless, there is research on particular programs and this research provides at 
least some support for deterrence theory. 
 In order for policing strategies to invoke deterrence theory, changes in strategies 
must affect the objective certainty, severity or celerity of punishment.  Two studies 
provide evidence that the police are able to affect objective certainty.  As mentioned 
above, Wilson and Boland (1978) explored proactive policing and found that proactive 
patrol was related to increased certainty.  Sampson and Cohen (1988) replicated the 
Wilson and Boland (1978) research in 171 cities in 1980.  They also found that more 
aggressive policing was associated with more arrest certainty for robbery and burglary 
suggesting that changes in the police can affect certainty.  
 One particular policy strategy that exploits the effect of certainty on crime is hot 
spots policing.  This is a policing strategy that identifies the areas that have the most 
crime and focuses policing on these particular areas.  There are different ways that the 
police can focus on these areas (e.g. problem oriented policing), but the key to hot spots 
policing is that it focuses on a particular location with a high proportion of crime.  There 
have been many studies conducted on hotspots policing (e.g. Braga, 2005; Kennedy, 
2009; Kleiman, 1988; Koper and Mayo-Wilson, 2006; Sherman, 1990; Sherman et al, 
2002; Sherman and Weisburd, 1995; Weisburd, 2005; Weisburd and Green, 1995).  
Several of these studies have been randomized controlled trials.  For example, Sherman 
and Weisburd (1995) conducted a randomized controlled experiment of hot spots 
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policing in Minneapolis.  In the areas of high crime, the experiment doubled the patrol 
(55 of 110 hotspots).  Increases in patrol did cause modest reductions in crime and large 
reductions in disorder.  The decline in total crimes ranged from 6-13%.  Weisburd and 
Green (1995) also used a randomized experiment in Jersey City, NJ to look at hotspots in 
controlling drug markets.  They also found support for hot spots policing.  In 2008, Braga 
conducted a review of the hot spots policing literature and found support for significant 
reductions in seven of nine studies conducted on hotspots.  In sum, there is support for a 
deterrent effect of hotspots policing, but with only nine quality studies as of 2008. 
 Kennedy et al. (2001) reviews pulling levers policing, a policing strategy that is a 
deterrence based strategy attempting to provide targeted enforcement by increasing 
certainty, severity, and celerity of punishment within the entire criminal justice system 
for certain individuals in certain circumstances (e.g. gang members committing violent 
crime in Boston).  Pulling levers policing typically involves several steps in order to be 
conducted thoroughly.  These include 1) picking a particular crime or problem to focus 
on, 2) working with different criminal justice agencies including, but not limited to 
police, prosecution, and probation, 3) gathering information about particular offenders or 
groups of offenders who participate in the problem of interest 4) directing enforcement at 
this group of offenders using all  available enforcement methods 5) providing prevention 
services to the same group of offenders, and finally 6) openly communicating with 
offenders the nature and purpose of the pulling levers strategy (Kennedy, 2006).   
Pulling levers policing has been conducted in many different cities.  Operation 
Ceasefire in Boston, MA was one of the early successful implementations for pulling 
levers policing.  This program addressed a small group of young gang members.  
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Research conducted suggests that Operation Ceasefire was associated with a fast 
reduction in youth homicide victimization, shots-fired calls, and gun incidents (Braga et 
al., 2001).  Similar programs were attempted in other areas around the country including 
Indianapolis and High Point, NC.  Indianapolis experienced a homicide reduction similar 
to Boston while other comparable Midwestern cities did not experience the same drop 
(McGarrell et al, 2006).  In High Point, NC, four of the most serious offenders were 
arrested and while other offenders were not arrested, but were told of their increased risk 
of arrest (Cook, 2012).  In a follow-up study, Corsaro et al. (2012) found that violence in 
High Point, N.C. was reduced by 12%.  In general, there appears to be support for pulling 
levers policing, but recent findings have been more modest than the initial strong results 
(Cook, 2012).  
 In sum, there is support for the deterrent effect of two different policing strategies: 
hot spots policing and pulling levers puling.  Again, the extent of the effect is unknown 




 Imprisonment is another policy that attempts to reduce crime.  One of the ways 
that it can reduce crime is by deterrence, thus research on the effect of imprisonment on 
crime is at least partially research on deterrence theory.  Isolating the deterrent effect is 
difficult because of the incapacitation effect: crime rates may decrease because people 
refrain from crime because they do not want to be imprisoned (deterrent effect), or crime 
rates may decrease because offenders are incarcerated and lack the opportunity to commit 
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crime (incapacitation effect).  This section will review the literature exploring these 
questions and show that there is at least some modest support for a deterrent effect of 
imprisonment. 
 As with the policing literature, research on imprisonment struggles with 
simultaneity.  Levitt (1996) attempted to address this issue by using court orders to 
reduce overcrowding as an instrumental variable to explore the effect of prison on crime 
in data collected from 1971 to 1993.  There was an effect of prison on crime: each year of 
prison for a person resulted in the reduction of 15 crimes.  While the instrumental 
variable technique can help determine causality, in cannot distinguish between the 
incapacitation effect and the deterrent effect of prison. 
 Two different reviews exploring the effect of prison on the crime drop in the 
1990s, find that prison does have an effect ranging from 4-33% (Levitt, 2004; Spelman, 
2000).  Spelman (2000) reviewed the literature on incarceration and found that studies 
have come up with widely varying results.  He describes improved methods, but claims 
that there are several remaining problems in the literature including simultaneity, omitted 
variables, and differences between states.  Despite these remaining difficulties with the 
research, the research does find that prison affects crime rates, reducing index crime rates 
anywhere from 20-40%.  When looking specifically at the crime drop, Spelman (2000) 
claims that between 4 and 21% of the crime drop can be attributed to incarceration.  
Levitt (2004) also finds an effect, but finds a larger effect: the use of imprisonment from 
1990 to 2000 accounted for about 1/3 of the decrease in the crime rate. 
 Like police research, imprisonment does have descriptive data that provides a 
counter example to the deterrent effect of prison.  As mentioned above, Canada had a 
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similar decrease in crime as the United States in the 1990s, but instead of the prison 
population growing during this time period as in the U.S., the rate of incarceration 
declined by 10% from 1993 to 2001 suggesting that imprisonment may not always have 
the same effect (Johnson, 2004; Paternoster, 2010). 
 In sum, empirical research does suggest that imprisonment decreases crime, but 
there are methodological limitations that need to be addressed.  Evidence that 
imprisonment affects crime may be an incarceration effect or a deterrent effect.  
Therefore, we can tentatively conclude that imprisonment research provides some 
support for deterrence theory, although more research should be conducted. 
 
Other Policy Evaluations 
Other policy evaluations that explore deterrence theory often address specific 
legislation in specific states such as three strikes laws in California or gun enhancement 
laws.  By enacting more severe legislation, states are invoking the severity part of 
deterrence; more severe punishment should change the perceptions that people have of 
punishment and thus, cause them to commit less crime. 
 Several studies have looked at sentence enhancements and the findings appear to 
be mixed.  Loftin and colleagues in the early 1980s conducted a series of studies to 
explore the effect of sentence enhancements for gun crimes (Loftin and McDowall 1981; 
Loftin, Heumann, and McDowall 1983; Loftin and McDowall 1984).  In general, findings 
from these studies were not conclusive, but as a whole, it appears that enhancements did 
not prevent gun use.  In accordance with Loftin and colleague’s lack of support for the 
deterrent effect of sentence enhancements, Raphael and Ludwig (2003) found no effect.  
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A program in Richmond, VA targeted perpetrators of gun crime with more severe Federal 
prosecution.  When compared to juvenile adult homicide arrest rates and other cities 
without this policy, the threat of the more severe punishment did not have an effect.  The 
studies on sentence enhancements suggest that sentence enhancements have a mixed 
effect at best. 
 Kessler and Levitt (1999), on the other hand, do find support for deterrence theory 
in an attempt to isolate the deterrent effect from the incapacitation effect.  In 1982, 
California passed Proposition 8, a law that increased enhancements for repeat offenders.  
When Proposition 8 was passed individuals who would not have been incarcerated 
previous to the enactment of the law were incarceration and therefore, in the short term, 
any effect of the law should have only been a deterrent effect of the law itself.  In support 
of deterrence, in the year after the passing of the law, crimes eligible for the enhancement 
appear to reduce by 4% and after 3 years, by 8%.  Interestingly, the effect continues to 
grow over time (reductions up to 20%), suggesting that there is an incapacitation effect as 
well.  (For a critique see Webster, Doob, and Zimring, 2006).   
 Several studies have explored the effect of California’s three strikes laws.  In 
general, they find that they may affect certain people in certain circumstances.  
Stolzenberg and D’Alessio (1997) used an interrupted time series design and found that 
the three strikes law did not have a deterrent effect on serious or petty crime.  Zimring, 
Hawkins, and Kamin (2001) also looked at before and after trends of California’s three 
strikes law but found that the felony crime rate did fall, if only at a maximum of 2%.  In 
addition, the law appeared to affect specific people, those who already had two qualifying 
offenses.   
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 Finally, similar to Zimring, Hawkins, and Kamin (2001)’s findings, Helland and 
Taborrok (2007) found that a certain group was deterred by the three strikes law in 
California.  Helland and Taborrok (2007) compared the criminal activity of an individual 
who was convicted of a qualifying offense to those who committed a qualifying offense, 
but pled down to a non-qualifying offense.  They found support for deterrence among the 
group that had already committed two strikeable offenses: the threat of a third strike 
reduced felony arrest by 17-20%. 
 Another policy evaluation that is related to deterrence theory looks at the effect of 
a unique community supervision program in Hawaii, Project HOPE (Hawaii Opportunity 
Probation with Enforcement) (Hawken and Kleiman, 2009).  This is a policy that 
attempts to make punishment more certain.  To do this, the program has very clear rules 
and consequences and follows through on these consequences.  There is a greater level of 
monitoring including regular and random drug testing and when violations occur, short, 
but certain jail stays are enforced.  Hawken and Kleiman (2009) conducted a randomized 
experiment finding that those who were assigned to Project HOPE had lower rates of 
positive drug tests, missed appointments, and were less likely to be arrested and 
imprisoned. 
In sum, more severe sentences appear to have little, if any deterrent effect, 
suggesting, as other deterrence research has, that severity is less import than certainty.  
The effect that severity does seem to have is for a very specific group who would be 
well-informed about the punishment (those who have already been punished and know 





 Finally, an area in which deterrence theory has been applied and is particularly 
relevant to this dissertation is within the regulatory justice system.  The regulatory justice 
system typically includes those acts within corporate crime that are outside the bounds of 
the criminal justice system including “the process of investigation, adjudication, and 
punishment” (Frank and Lombness, 1988, p. 5).  Regulatory justice is administered by 
regulatory agencies such as the Environmental Protection Agency (Simpson, 2002).  As 
mentioned above, the regulatory justice system is an apt comparison to the NFL in that it 
uses rules to secure compliance with rules, in this case, regulatory rules (Frank and 
Lombness, 1988).  In addition, similar to the NFL, the rules of the regulatory justice 
system are used as an attempt to prevent potential harm as opposed to reacting to 
previously committed rule breaking behavior and breaking the rules does not require 
intent (Frank and Lombness, 1988).  For these reasons it is useful to look to prior 
research on deterrence within the area of corporate crime to inform this dissertation.   
 Regulatory justice research is similar to other deterrence research in that it 
explores perceptions and uses scenario or vignette style research.  As with other research 
on deterrence, the results of research in corporate crime focusing on formal punishment is 
mixed.  In general there is support for formal sanctions, but the effect does not appear to 
operate independently from informal sanctions. 
 The support of formal sanctions has been studied using a wide variety of samples.  
For example, support has been found with longitudinal data from companies from the oil 
refining, motor vehicles and parts, air crafts and parts, inorganic chemicals, steel, metal 
containers, and tires and tubes industries (Simpson and Koper, 1992), used car dealers 
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(Harris and McCrae, 2005), tax defrauders (Murphy and Harris, 2007; Murphy, 2008), 
MBA students (Paternoster and Simpson, 1996), and U.S. companies within the steel, 
pulp and paper, and oil refining industries (Simpson et al, 2013).  Despite the variety and 
amount of support, most of the research has found that formal sanctions do not work in 
isolation and instead has found that formal sanctions work through other informal 
mechanisms.  These mechanisms include morality (Paternoster and Simpson, 1996), 
outcome expectations (Smith, Simpson and Huang (2007), social harm (Vandenbergh, 
2004), and negative social and reputational consequences for the firm (Simpson, 2002; 
Simpson, Garner, and Gibbs, 2007; Simpson et al. 2013).  In sum, the corporate crime 
literature appears to show slightly more support for deterrence than the criminal justice 
literature, but points to the more recent rational choice models that include informal 
sanctions in addition to formal sanctions. 
 Deterrence research has gone through many stages and can be conducted in many 
different arenas from student population perceptions to the effect of certain criminal 
justice system policies.  In general, the literature has found at least mild support for 
deterrence theory, with the greatest support for certainty, little support for severity, and 
barely any research on celerity.  Because this dissertation applies deterrence theory 
within the context of sports, it is important to review the literature that has made this 





CHAPTER 3: THE CONNECTION BETWEEN CRIMINOLOGY AND SPORTS 
 
 The connection between criminology and sports has been discussed from different 
angles within different disciplines.  As evidenced by prior literature, sports provide a 
unique opportunity to explore many different issues (e.g. Duggan and Levitt, 2002; 
Horowitz and McDaniel, 2013; Kahn, 2000; Munasinghe et al, 2001; Moskowitz and 
Wertheim, 2011; Torgler, 2009).  There is no exception to these arguments when using 
sport to study deterrence theory, and specifically how punishment affects rule breaking.  
The literature connecting criminology and sports can be divided into literature that 
defines and describes deviance and literature that explores deterrence both for outside of 
the game behavior and within-game behavior.  This proposal will review the literature on 
within-game and outside of the game behavior to provide background for the focus of this 
dissertation: player rule violations.  
 
DEVIANCE IN SPORTS 
 Deviance is generally divided into within-game deviance and out-of-game 
deviance.  Within the game deviance can be further split into three categories: 1) rule 
violations, 2) norm violations (e.g. stealing signs between pitcher and catcher in 
baseball), or 3) particularly violent behavior (Atkinson and Young, 2008; Delany and 
Madigan, 2009; Duggan and Levitt, 2002; Eitzen, 1981).  Out-of-game deviance includes 
a variety of behaviors such as criminal behavior, sex scandals, gambling, and using 
performance enhancing drugs (Atkinson and Young, 2008; Delany and Madigan, 2009; 
Duggan and Levitt, 2002).   
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 In addition to defining deviance, there is some discussion about why within-game 
rule violations occur (“cheating”).  Lueschen (1976) provided two situations that will 
likely lead to more cheating: 1) when there is increased uncertainty in the outcome of the 
match and 2) when the rewards for winning are greater than the costs of cheating.  
Hypothesis two invokes rational choice and expected utility theories and implicitly 
includes punishment.  As mentioned in the deterrence section, punishment adds to the 
costs of cheating and thus may prevent a person from cheating.  Lueschen (1976) 
continues this discussion by highlighting the necessity of referees to act as agents of 
control, but he stops just short of deterrence by claiming that the purpose of sanctions is 
to restore equality, not to prevent future behavior.  The idea of using punishment to 
restore equality is discussed further by Brickman (1977), but Brickman focuses even 
more on defining punishment in sports.  Brickman (1977) will be discussed further 
below.  The deviance literature defines and sets up a framework in which punishment and 
rule infractions fit, but does not discuss in any detail what place, if any, deterrence has in 
sports.  The next section will explore literature related to sports that specifically address 
parts of deterrence theory. 
 
DETERRENCE IN SPORTS 
Just as the deviance literature is divided into within-game behavior and out-of-
game behavior, the deterrence literature explores the effect of punishment or the threat of 





Deterrence literature that focuses on out-of-game deviance generally includes 
research on performance enhancing drugs and NCAA infractions.  Using a scenario based 
survey with 116 respondents from Australian football clubs in which drug testing occurs, 
Strelan and Boeckmann (2006) explore drug testing and perceptual deterrence.  Players 
were given scenarios that described questions including whether the respondent would 
use performance enhancing drugs if it facilitated a faster recovery from an injury.  The 
variety of deterrence measures that were present in different scenarios included: legal, 
material loss, important other, public, teammate, moral beliefs, and health concerns.  The 
researchers found that each deterrent was significantly related to lower drug use.  By 
asking, ‘‘Even though you cannot be caught by the authorities, how guilty do you think 
you would feel if you used HGH in this scenario?’’ (p. 2918), they found that moral 
beliefs had the strongest effect.  In addition, the researchers in this study found that the 
particular situation influenced a person’s decision to use performance enhancing drugs.  
Specifically, they were more likely to state they would use drugs if the drugs were for use 
with recovery from an injury; 50% of the sample responded that they would use banned 
substances when injured.  Strelan and Boeckmann (2006) found that the relationship 
between legal sanctions and infractions was mediated by moral beliefs and health 
concerns about the effect of the drugs: when moral beliefs and health concerns were 
added into the model, legal sanctions became non-significant and the magnitude of the 
coefficient decreased (-.39 to -.16).  To determine whether the effect of legal sanctions 
was mediated by other deterrents, the researchers conducted a two stage multiple 
regression: in the first stage legal sanctions were included as an independent variable, and 
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the second stage added the non-legal sanctions.  The researchers used Sobel’s (1982) 
mediation test to determine if this decrease was in fact significant.  In sum, Strelan and 
Boeckmann suggest that legal sanctions affect behavior by influencing the moral beliefs 
of some people.   
Another more recent exploration of the effect of sanctions on out-of-game 
deviance focused on NCAA rule violations by college football and basketball players.  
Cullen and his colleagues (2012) conducted a survey of 2,000 male football and 
basketball players to determine the extent of rule infractions in the NCAA and why these 
infractions occurred.  The authors suggest that while these findings are informative, they 
should be seen as a resource to build upon because the data was collected almost 20 years 
ago (1994) and the response rate was only 32.4%.  They found that 7 out of 10 
respondents committed an infraction with most reporting minor infractions.  Cullen et al. 
(2012) tested several different theories to determine why athletes may be prone to rule 
infractions including deprivation/strain, differential association/social learning, social 
bond/control, opportunity, individual difference, organizational, and most importantly for 
this research, deterrence.  When deterrence was in a model on its own, severity of 
punishment was the only deterrence variable that significantly predicted rule breaking, 
but when included in the model with other theoretically informed variables, the effect of 
severity became insignificant while friend’s deviance, other’s values, parental 
attachment, and religious fundamentalist were significant.  Because of the surprising 
certainty finding, Cullen et al. (2012) provided discussion of the certainty of punishment 
in the NCAA.  Certainty is measured by asking two questions: (1) “If I broke an NCAA 
rule, like taking money from a “booster,” there is a good chance that I would get 
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caught.”, and (2) “I think that I could break most NCAA rules and never get caught” (p. 
704).  Cullen et al. (2012) suggest that because at this time, so little attention and 
resources were spent on enforcement (1% of the NCAA budget), perhaps certainty could 
be more effective if more resources were devoted to rule enforcement.  In sum, they 
found no support for deterrence, although with old data, a low response rate, and 
questions about the certainty measure, this topic is worth exploring more. 
 
In-game behavior 
 Literature that explores punishment for within-game behavior includes a 
theoretical discussion by Brickman (1977) and Mark et al. (1983) and empirical research 
(Allen, 2002; Heckelman and Yates, 2003; Levitt, 2002; McCormick and Tollison, 1984; 
Witt, 2005).  Brickman (1977) and Mark et al. (1983) compare the punishment of sports 
to the criminal justice system and suggest that the criminal justice system would be well-
served by using the punishment system used in sports.  Brickman discusses four unique 
characteristics of sports’ reaction to violence.  First, deviance is inevitably a part of sports 
because conflict is recognized as a central part of the game.  Second, the purpose of 
punishment is to restore fairness, what Brickman (1977) terms “equity punishment.”  
Third, most players are punished equally.  Better players do not get special compensation.  
The final unique characteristic that Brickman (1977) discusses is that after a punishment, 
a player is able to start clean and is not hindered by collateral consequences of the 
punishment.  Two of the points in Brickman’s description of sports punishment do not 
seem to hold true in sports today.  Punishment in sports does not appear to be equity 
punishment or restoring fairness.  In fact, punishment in sports has a certain element of 
pure punishment.  For example, in football, if the purpose was to restore fairness then a 
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team would likely be allowed to replay the play in which a penalty was committed, but 
instead, a team is often allowed to replay the play and is awarded extra yards or a down.  
The second point that does not hold true is that players are not always able to start clean 
after an infraction.  In most sports there is some way for punishment to be more severe 
after multiple infractions.  For example, in basketball, after five fouls a player is ejected 
from the game, in soccer, two yellow cards in the same match result in player ejection, 
and in football, a second finable offense results in a higher fine.  The fact that the 
punishment systems within sports are more similar to the criminal justice system than 
Brickman (1977) and Mark et al. (1983) present, allows sports to provide an even better 
venue to learn about  the effects of punishment on behavior and translate those lessons to 
the criminal justice system. 
 In addition to these descriptive pieces of within-game punishment, there is 
empirical literature that explores within-game behavior.  There are several studies that 
explore the certainty of punishment within sports (Allen, 2002; Heckelman and Yates, 
2003; Levitt, 2002; McCormick and Tollison, 1984).  McCormick and Tollison (1984) 
researched the effect of an increased number of referees in basketball at the macro level 
over two seasons.  In their study, they equated referees with police and fouls with arrests.  
In the ACC, the number of referees increased from two to three between two seasons.  
McCormick and Tollison (1984) found that the number of fouls called decreased with the 
increase in referees suggesting that as the probability of detection increased, rule 
infractions decreased.   
 The National Hockey League (NHL) had a unique situation in the 1998/1999 
season that several economists explored (Allen, 2002; Heckelman and Yates, 2003; 
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Levitt, 2002).  In this season, the NHL attempted to determine the effect of an extra 
referee by using one referee in some games and two referees in other games.  Allen 
(2002), at the individual level, and Heckleman and Yates (2003), using game played by 
home team as a unit of analysis and an instrumental variable technique, found similar 
results: increasing the number of referees actually led to an increase in penalties 
suggesting what Allen (2002) refers to as an “apprehension” effect as opposed to a 
deterrent effect.  They suggest that the extra referee resulted in an increase in the number 
of penalties actually witnessed and called.  Levitt (2002), explored the same season using 
a macro level analysis and found that there was not a change in the number of penalties 
from one-referee games to two-referee games.  With further analysis, Levitt (2002) 
determined that an extra referee did not change the probability of punishment, making the 
analysis of limited use when exploring the effects of more certain punishment within 
deterrence.   
 One article that is particularly relevant to this research is Witt (2005).  Witt 
(2005) uses a rule change within soccer to explore the effect of punishment on rule 
breaking behavior.1  Similar to the studies in the NHL, the English Premier League had a 
rule change that provided an opportunity to explore the effect of severity of sanctions on 
penalties.  In soccer, there are three different types of fouls given in response to rule 
breaking (from least severe to most severe): a no card foul, yellow card foul, and red card 
foul.  In 1998, there was a rule change that made tackles from behind a more serious red 
card offense.  Witt (2005), using Poisson Regression, estimated whether the number of 
fouls changed with the rule change.  Witt (2005) found that the number of red cards did 
1 Due to the confusion between American football and soccer, this proposal will refer to football as soccer 
and American football as football regardless of how it is described in the original article. 
41 
 
                                                          
not increase, but the number of yellow card fouls and no card fouls did increase.  Witt 
(2005) interprets this finding as a displacement of fouls or that players substitute lesser 
fouls for the red card fouls.  A limitation of this study is that the fouls are not delineated 
by player activity and thus an increase in a type of foul does not tell the researchers what 
activity the player is committing.  For example, a red card could be a tackle from behind 
or some other flagrant foul.  In addition, the changing numbers of fouls could be the 
result of changing referee behavior.  Perhaps, as a result of the rule change, referees 
called more yellow and no card fouls which deterred players from committing the more 
serious red card fouls.  To summarize the empirical literature, deterrence in sports has an 
unknown effect: increasing certainty could have an apprehension effect or no effect and 
increasing severity could cause displacement or change referee behavior.  This literature 
leaves an opportunity for future research to explore the effect of deterrence within sports.   
 In sum, there is a connection between criminology and sports that has been 
explored from many different angles including discussions of deviance and cheating and 
empirical analysis of the effect of various changes in the game on rule breaking behavior.  
In general, the research conducted includes macro level, short term, or limited 
information about player activity.  This dissertation will add to the literature by providing 
long term, detailed data.   
 The review of the literature has illustrated that the deterrence literature, while 
vast, still leaves room for more research to be conducted.  As illustrated by past research, 
sports provide a unique environment in which to explore deterrence, particularly in the 
National Football League where this study explores the effect of punishment over 13 
years.  The next Chapter will describe the research questions, data, and methods.  
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CHAPTER 4: DATA AND METHODS 
 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This dissertation attempts to expand upon existing deterrence literature by using a 
detailed longitudinal dataset.  This dissertation addresses the research question and 
hypotheses at both the league and team level2: the league level will explore all penalties 
throughout the league, specifically looking at whether punishment from the previous 
week for the entire league affects rule breaking behavior for the entire league in the 
current week (N=273 weeks).  The team level analysis is exploring whether a particular 
team’s punishment from the previous game affects the same team’s rule breaking 
behavior in the current game (N=6,898 games) 
 General deterrence suggests that the entire league will be deterred by punishment.  
While this dataset provides a unique opportunity to explore general deterrence at the 
league level, this is not a completely clean measure of general deterrence.  A clean 
measure of, general deterrence would only include those individuals who did not 
experience punishment, but this analysis includes both those individuals who experienced 
punishment and those who did not.  This follows the methods conducted by prior macro 
studies of general deterrence (e.g. Chiricos and Waldo, 1970; Corman and Mocan, 2000; 
Gibbs, 1968; Levitt, 1997; Shi 2009).  
More recent deterrence literature claims that groups or gangs are also important 
(Kennedy, 2009), suggesting that the team may be an important unit of analysis.  In the 
sports context there are two main reasons the team may matter.  First, the team receiving 
2 This analysis could also be done at the individual level, but since the NFL attempts to change groups’ 
behaviors and individuals move in and out of the league, this dissertation is focusing on the league and 
team level analyses. 
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the penalty may feel the punishment more acutely.  In fact, punishments in football are 
typically group punishments, so while one player may commit unnecessary roughness, 
the entire team receives the yardage and down as punishment.  Second, a team may 
continue to receive informal costs and benefits throughout the week based on their own 
penalties.  For example, they may be punished in practice with sprints or rewarded by 
something as overt as money, as illustrated by the bounty scandal3.  It is for these reasons 
that this dissertation explores the effect of punishment at both the league and team level.  
Below is the research question and hypotheses for this dissertation.  These questions are 
applicable to both the league and team analyses.   
 
RQ: Is there evidence of general deterrence?   
H1: Past punishments will reduce the number of current rule infractions. 
H2: Past fines will reduce the number of current rule infractions. 
H3: Past punishments for violent behavior will reduce the number of current 
violent rule infractions. 
H4: Past fines will reduce the number of current violent rule infractions. 
 
DATA  
 The data for this dissertation were downloaded from two different sources: 1) 
play-by-play NFL data from armchairanalysis.com (2013) and 2) individual-level fine 
data from justfines.com (2013).  This section will briefly describe each data source and 
3The bounty scandal was a bounty system initiated by a coach of the New Orleans Saints during seasons 
2009-2011, was supported by players and ignored by management.  The bounty system paid players money 
for deliberately hitting and injuring opposing players.  The sum of the money given and received totaled in 
the thousands (Maske, 2012; “Saints Bounty,” 2013). 
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then describe the combined dataset used in this dissertation.  The play-by-play data 
includes information for each player from 2000-2012.  There is information about every 
play and every player that was involved in each play.  Details about penalties include 
information about each penalty committed and the resulting punishment that was 
enforced.  This dataset includes 6,541 individuals, 562,580 plays, and 50,070 penalties.  
The fine data was collected from 2000-2012 and includes the date the fine was imposed, 
the team, player, amount, and description of the fine.  The fines included in this analysis 
are imposed for within-game, play-related behavior.  For example, coaches’ fines and 
fines for technical violations such as uniform violations are not included.  There are 426 
fines.  To answer the research question at both the team and the league level, two 
different datasets were created.  The league level has the full sample as described above.  
The team level dataset also includes all the data described above, but they are 
disaggregated amongst the 32 teams in the NFL. 
 
Strengths and Limitations 
There are many strengths of this dataset.  As mentioned in the introduction there 
are four unique characteristics that make this dataset particularly useful for studying 
deterrence: 1) there is greater detail offered in this dataset than other rule breaking 
datasets, 2) the direct effect of the penalty is observed 3) punishment is enforced 
immediately, and 4) there is almost perfect knowledge of punishment received.  Other 
strengths are the longitudinal nature of the data and the potential implications for 
deterrence theory.  Although using football to study deterrence theory may not seem 
intuitive, rational choice theory posits that criminal offending is a decision that is made 
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like any other decision by fully rational people (Becker, 1968; Cornish and Clarke, 1986; 
Matsueda et al., 2006) and as such, the decision to break rules within football is a unique 
opportunity to explore the effect of punishment on behavior.  Some scholars argue that 
sports are different because violence is normative (Brickman, 1977), but the culture of 
sports does not change the intention of the punishment.  The intent of the punishment is 
to change behavior (R. Anderson, personal communication, September 18, 2013) and in 
fact, the NFL claims that the punishment is changing behavior by making the game safer 
(R. Goodell, October 3, 2013).  This dataset allows this research to explore the claim that 
punishment changes behavior and specifically whether penalties and fines change within-
game, rule-breaking behavior. 
 There are also some limitations with this dataset.  The first limitation has to do 
with the theoretical application of the dataset.  This dissertation attempts to explore 
general deterrence at the league and team level, but the nature of the data makes this is a 
little less clean than it would ideally be.  General deterrence is typically defined as 
deterrence of people in the general population who are not punished (Nagin, 2013).  This 
is in contrast to specific deterrence which deals with the effect of punishment on someone 
who has been punished (Nagin, 2013).  As mentioned above, the league level general 
deterrence measure includes those individuals who are punished for rule-breaking 
behavior so it is not a completely clean measure of general deterrence.  In addition, 
because the team gets punished as a team, it could be argued that this is actually a 
measure of specific deterrence.  I argue that this is not the case because the entire team 
does not experience the official punishment in the same way (specific deterrence would 
not have any variation in the way an individual experiences punishment).  For example, 
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the individual who committed the infraction experiences the most direct punishment: they 
know the behavior that occurred, their number is called out and they experience all the 
costs and benefits of that particular punishment.  The rest of the team on the field 
experiences the next level of punishment: some of the players on the field likely observed 
the behavior, and they all experience the punishment first hand (they have to fight to get 
the yardage back, or prevent a first down from occurring).  The final level of punishment 
if the rest of the team that is not on the field.  They experience the punishment by 
watching and perhaps having to adjust their behavior when they do get on the field (if 
they get on the field).  The entire team experiences the punishment throughout the week 
if the penalty had an effect on the outcome of the game and they all experience informal 
costs and benefits throughout the week that may vary slightly based on their position or 
role on the team.  Therefore, there are people on the team who are deterred by a formal 
punishment that they do not experience firsthand (as specific deterrence would require) 
and the team analysis is a general deterrence analysis albeit a slightly less clean measure 
than a perfect measure of those who do not experience the punishment at all. 
Another limitation due to the observational nature of the data of the NFL, is that 
the dataset does not include all the informal sanctions and incentives that are present 
within football.  For example, the discovered bounty system for the New Orleans Saints 
where players were being paid for committing penalties, or a potential high five from a 
team mate for committing a particularly hard tackle.  In addition, similar to the 
limitations in Witt (2005)’s exploration of soccer, the data do not distinguish between the 
particular actions that resulted in the penalty.  While there is much more detail in football 
than in soccer (57 different types of penalties), there is not access to the different types of 
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behavior that constitute the categories of penalties.  For example, the controversial 
helmet-to-helmet hits are included in many different categories like ‘personal foul,’ 
‘unnecessary roughness’, and ‘roughing the passer.’  One other limitation is the flip side 
of the strength above.  While this dataset provides a unique opportunity to explore 
deterrence it is not criminal justice data.  Blumstein and Benedict (1999) find that NFL 
players appear to have the same number of arrests as the general population, but that the 
NFL population is hard to find a comparison group for.  The NFL generally consists of 
people from disadvantaged backgrounds who are making large sums of money 
(Blumstein and Benedict, 1999).  Due to the fact that a comparable general population 
may be difficult to determine, the policy implications, while important, may not be 
directly applicable to the criminal justice system.  Instead, the intent of this research is to 
guide discussion about deterrence based policies and to provoke more research to 
replicate these findings within the criminal justice system.  Finally, due to the nature of 
the data, there is no clear measure of informal costs and benefits.  This dissertation 
attempts to control for some of the potential costs and benefits, but to address them more 
completely, it would be necessary to have player interviews.   
To address the research questions this dissertation used two different sets of 
variables: aggregate-league wide per week measures and aggregate per team per game 
measures.  Descriptions of both types of variables are included below. 
 
Dependent Variables 
 Penalties per week is a count measure of the number of penalties committed 
league-wide for each week in the dataset.  The NFL defines a week as Thursday through 
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Monday.  For the purpose of the league-level analysis, a week is defined as Thursday 
through Wednesday.  This is different from the way the NFL defines a week in order to 
account for fines that are given as a result of actions in the Monday night game.  While it 
is arguable that Sunday games are more likely to be influenced by Thursday night games 
than games the previous week, this dissertation argues that because there are so few 
games on Monday or Thursday, most teams will be affected by the entire week’s games 
as opposed to just one game on Monday or Thursday.  An alternative league-wide 
measure of current rule-breaking behaviors is average penalties per game, an average of 
the number of penalties in each game league-wide (See Appendices C and D for 
sensitivity analysis).  For the team analyses, penalties per game is included as a count of 
the number of penalties each team committed in a particular game.  Each of these 
measures are also created for “violent” penalties (violent penalties per week and violent 
penalties per game).  See Table 1 for categories of penalties with violent penalties 
indicated.  See Figures 1 2, 3 and 4 below for the distribution of these variables 
illustrating that all the variables are normally distributed except for violent penalties at 
the team level.  For the league level, the small grouping of penalties to the left of the 
normally distributed variable can be accounted for by the post season weeks with fewer 
games (See Appendices A and B for the distribution without post season).  These 
distributions can be explained as the percentage of the sample that had the referenced 
number of penalties per week.  For example, within the league violent penalties 
distribution (Figure 2), a little over 3% of the sample had about 30 violent penalties per 




Table 1. Categories of Penalties 
Penalty Freq. Percent Cum. Violent 
12 On-field 64 0.19 0.19  
Chop Block 109 0.32 0.5 X 
Clipping 25 0.07 0.58  
Defensive Holding 2,321 6.76 7.34  
Defensive Offside 3,755 10.94 18.29  
Defensive Pass Interference 2,997 8.74 27.02  
Delay of Game 1,464 4.27 31.29  
Disqualification 39 0.11 31.4  
Encroachment 1,030 3 34.4  
Face Mask 1,435 4.18 38.59 X 
Fair Catch Interference 84 0.24 38.83  
False Start 3,252 9.48 48.31  
Horse Collar 91 0.27 48.58 X 
Illegal Bat 23 0.07 48.64  
Illegal Blindside Block 15 0.04 48.69 X 
Illegal Block Above the Waist 1,565 4.56 53.25  
Illegal Contact 1,405 4.1 57.34  
Illegal Crackback 73 0.21 57.56 X 
Illegal Cut 1 0 57.56  
Illegal Formation 341 0.99 58.55  
Illegal Forward Pass 131 0.38 58.93  
Illegal Kick 12 0.03 58.97  
Illegal Motion 354 1.03 60  
Illegal Procedure 18 0.05 60.05  
Illegal Receiver Pass 2 0.01 60.06  
Illegal Scrimmage Kick 2 0.01 60.07  
Illegal Shift 210 0.61 60.68  
Illegal Substitution 49 0.14 60.82  
Illegal Touch Kick 137 0.4 61.22  
Illegal Touch Pass 110 0.32 61.54  
Illegal Use of Hands 697 2.03 63.57 X 
Illegal Wedge 3 0.01 63.58  
Ineligible Downfield Kick 289 0.84 64.42  
Ineligible Downfield Pass 19 0.06 64.48  
Intentional Grounding 529 1.54 66.02  
Interference with Opportunity to 
Catch 63 0.18 66.2  
Invalid Fair Catch Signal 22 0.06 66.27  
Kickoff Out of Bounds 17 0.05 66.32  
Leaping 7 0.02 66.34  
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Leverage 23 0.07 66.41  
Low Block 85 0.25 66.65 X 
Neutral Zone 681 1.98 68.64  
Offensive Holding 4,255 12.4 81.04  
Offensive Offside 76 0.22 81.26  
Offensive Pass Interference 1,093 3.19 84.45  
Offside on Free Kick 334 0.97 85.42  
Personal Foul 884 2.58 88 X 
Player Out of Bounds on Punt 80 0.23 88.23  
Roughing the Kicker 72 0.21 88.44 X 
Roughing the Passer 1,232 3.59 92.03 X 
Running Into the Kicker 176 0.51 92.54  
Short Free Kick 4 0.01 92.56  
Taunting 221 0.64 93.2  
Tripping 122 0.36 93.56 X 
Unnecessary Roughness 1,712 4.99 98.55 X 




Figure 1. Distribution of League Penalties per Week 
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Figure 3. Distribution of Penalties per Game per Team 
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Independent Variables  
 All of the independent variables will be used at both the league and team level.  
The primary independent variables to explore general deterrence will be measures of 
previous punishment: previous penalties, previous fines, and previous amount of fines.  
Each one of these variables will be a sum from the  either the previous week or the 
previous game: the number of penalties per week league wide or the number of penalties 
per game per team the previous game, the number of fines league-wide the previous 
week, and the monetary amount of the fines imposed league-wide the previous week.  For 
the analyses using violent fines as the dependent variable, previous penalties is replaced 
with previous violent penalties.  The decision to use previous violent penalties in the 
violent penalty analysis is based both in previous rational choice models that assume 
crime-specific analyses (Nagin, 1998) and in empirical research that has found limited 
support that deterrence is crime specific, i.e., crime prevention efforts focused on one 
type of crime are likely only to effect that particular type of crime (Anwar and Loughran, 
2011).   While the previous penalty measure is the same measure that is used for the 
dependent variable, because of the temporal lag, this research can use one measure to 
predict the other.  This technique has been used in prior research, specifically within 
policing literature.  For example, arrests have been used to predict police contact 
(Corman and Mocan, 2000), increased number of police have been used to predict UCR 
(police) reports of crime (Levitt, 1997), and increased enforcement has been used to 
predict calls for service (Sherman and Weisburd, 1995).  Each study that has used similar 
measures for independent and dependent variables has tried to correct for this in some 
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manner.  This dissertation uses the temporal lag to correct for the use of the same 
measure as independent and dependent variable.   
 
Controls 
Several control variables will be included in each model.  Several of the control 
variables are included as proxy measures for rational choice (attempting to address some 
of the informal costs and benefits) or decision-making variables (attempting to address 
the situation in which the decision to commit a penalty is being made).  These proxy 
variables will be noted and discussed below.  The league level analysis will include 
games per week, post season, season, and week.  Games per week is a count of the 
number of games in a particular week.  This is an important measure to include to control 
for the post-season when there are a fewer number of games each week.  Post-season is a 
dummy variable that will be ‘1’ if the game is a post-season game.  This control is 
included as a measure of rational choice.  It may be that because there is more at stake in 
the post-season a different number of penalties will be committed.  This is an example of 
a time in which a player’s cost benefit calculus might change based on the particular 
game, but the direction of the effect is unknown.  It may also be that referees change 
what penalties they enforce during the postseason.  Season will be included as a dummy 
variable for each season in the dataset because certain events may affect the number of 
penalties during a particular year.  For example, there was a well-publicized crackdown 
of helmet-helmet hits beginning in October, 2010 and the bounty scandal from 2009-
2011.  Both of these events may have affected the number of penalties league wide and 
for particular teams (See Figure 5 and 6).  The reference category for this variable is 
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season 2000 because that season has an average number of penalties.  Week will also be 
included as a dummy variable for each week in the season.  It is possible that as the 
season progresses players may feel there is more or less to lose depending on their 
standings and referees may change their style of refereeing as it gets close to the playoffs.  
Week 5 is included as a reference category for the all penalty analysis and Week 14 is the 
reference for the violent penalty analysis.  Each of these weeks are used as the reference 
category because they have an average number of relevant penalties (all or violent).  
Figures 5-10 below illustrate the changes across season and week.  These figures 
illustrate that there does appear to be variation across seasons and weeks, although not 
surprisingly, the variation across weeks appears to be less varied than that which occurs 
across seasons.  Surprisingly, there does not appear to be a large increase in penalties or 
fines in the some of the seasons that would be expected: 2010 with the helmet to helmet 




Figure 5. Penalties per Season 
 
 










































Figure 7. Fines per Season 
 
 



































Figure 9. Violent Penalties per Week 
 
 





































 The team level analysis will include several other control variables.  Lagbye is 
included as a binary measure of whether a team had a bye week the preceding week.  It 
may be that a bye week reduces the effect of the penalties from the week before the bye 
or that players’ behavior changes after a week off.  Home game is a binary variable with 
‘1’ designating home games.  The direction of this control variable is unknown: a home 
team player may feel they have more to lose therefore they may commit fewer penalties, 
or a home team player may respond to the crowd in their own stadium and commit more 
penalties.  Again, this control attempts to address some of the informal costs and benefits 
that are not measured by the dependent variables.  For example, the crowd may be an 
informal benefit when they cheer or an informal sanction when they boo.  Rational choice 
literature discusses the importance of informal sanctions in addition to formal sanctions 
(e.g. Cornish and Clarke, 1986).  In addition, the referees may change the level of penalty 
calling depending on whether the team is home or away (Moskowitz and Wertheim, 
2011).  Conference game is a binary variable with ‘1’ designating a conference game.  
This is another variable attempting to address the informal costs and benefits of rational 
choice theory.  In a conference game, injuring another player may have greater benefits 
for a team within the same conference, the crowd may be more involved in the game, and 
emotions may run higher bringing players into a visceral state discussed by Loewenstein 
and colleagues (1997).  Lagwin will be included as a dummy variable for whether the 
team won the game the previous week.  It is possible that a team coming off a win may 
behave differently than a team coming off a loss.  This differential behavior is supported 
by the decision-making literature on gains and losses.  Specifically, research has found 
that when people face a loss, they are more likely to be risk seeking and when facing a 
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gain, they are more likely to be risk aversive (e.g., Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; 
Pogarsky, 2009; Tversky and Kahneman, 1981).  Therefore, if a team won the game 
before, they may feel as though they are facing a loss and may be more likely to be 
aggressive in their penalty commission.  If they lost the game before, they may feel as 
though they are facing a win and may be more conservative in their penalty commission.  
Year will also be included in the team level analysis for the reasons mentioned above and 
week will again be included as a series of dummy variables.  Again, penalty commission 
may vary each week based on different competing pressures throughout the season.  
Finally, team will be included as a dummy variable for each team.  It is possible that 
different teams account for the differences in the number of penalties as certain teams 
have more penalties than other teams.  San Diego is the reference category for team in the 
all penalty analysis and Jacksonville is the reference category for the violent penalty 
analysis because these teams had an average number of relevant penalties across the 13 
years of data.  See Figures 11 and 12 below for examples of team variation in penalty 
commission.  These figures illustrate that there is variation in penalty commission: The 
New York Jets have the fewest penalties with 1,299 penalties, Oakland has the greatest 
number of penalties with 1,932 penalties.  For violent penalties, Tennessee has the 
greatest number of violent penalties (314) and Indiana has the fewest (192).  It is also 
interesting to note that while there is overlap between the two figures, the top and bottom 
five teams for the greatest number of penalties is not the same for all penalties and violent 
penalties (e.g. Detroit has the second highest number of violent penalties and is not in the 
top five for all penalties and Seattle has the 2nd lowest number of violent penalties but is 
not in the bottom five of all penalties). 
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Figure 11. Penalties per Team for 13 Years 
 
 


































































































































 The analysis for this dissertation consists of four main analyses: 1) Ordinary Least 
Squares Regression (OLS) for all penalties at the league level, 2) OLS for violent 
penalties at the league level, 3) OLS for all penalties at the team level, and 4) Poisson 
Regression for violent penalties at the team level.  All of the dependent variables except 
the violent penalties per team are normally distributed.  In addition, the relationship 
between previous penalties and current penalties is expected to be approximately linear.  
Therefore, an Ordinary Least Sqaures Regression is an appropriate model to use.  Violent 
penalties at the team level, on the other hand, is a count variable that is not normally 
distributed, therefore a Poisson Regression is an appropriate model to use.  It is possible 
to collapse this variable into a binary or categorical variable (violent penalty or not or 2+ 
penalties), but doing so results in loss of important variation in the dependent variable for 
this analysis (See Figures 1-4 for distributions of dependent variables).4  Poisson 
regression models have frequently been used for count variables within criminology (e.g. 
Osgood, 2000).  While there is not an overdispersion problem, this model was run with 
robust standard errors as suggested by Cameron and Trivedi (2009) to control for any 
mild violations of the assumptions.  These four analyses will allow the dissertation to 
determine if lagged punishment affects current rule infractions at the league and team 
levels.   
  
4 This dissertation ran the team level violent analyses as poisson, negative binomial, logistic, ordinal, and 
multinomial regressions and found that the results were all substantively the same. 
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CHAPTER 5: RESULTS 
 
LEAGUE ANALYSES  
 This section will briefly explain what led to the final model and then describe the 
results for the final model.  The models that were not used are included in Appendices C-
F.  First, a decision was made whether to include a penalties per week measure with a 
control for games per week or an average penalty per game measure as the dependent 
variable.  Comparing the models for the two dependent variable options confirms that the 
results were substantively the same (See Appendices C and D and Tables 2 and 3).  There 
were some slight differences in p-values, but this is likely due to a greater variance in the 
penalties per week measure (See descriptives in Appendix G).  This dissertation choose 
to use the penalties per week measure because it is a more intuitive measure to interpret 
and uses an actual count of the number of penalties as opposed to an average for the 
entire week.  Second, lagged fines could be included as a number of fines or a monetary 
amount of fines.  These two measures resulted in models that were very similar.  
Therefore, number of fines was used based on ease of interpretation (See Appendices E 
and F).  These decisions were consistent for the all penalty analyses and the violent 
penalty analyses.   





 The results for the analyses with all penalties are included below in Table 25.  
First, focusing on the independent variables of interest across all models, it appears that 
they have a fairly consistent effect.  In the model without any controls and the model with 
post season as a control, previous penalties is significantly related to a small increase in 
current rule infractions (B= 0.07, p= 0.006 and B= 0.06 P= 0.012), although when 
including season dummy variables, this effect approaches zero and loses significance 
(0.001, p= 0.953).  The effect of previous fines on current penalties appears to support the 
deterrence hypothesis in the model with no controls.  With each additional fine in the 
previous week, all penalties decrease by 1.34 penalties per week (p= 0.006).  Since the 
average number of penalties per week is 2,844, 1.34 is only a 0.047% decrease in 
penalties.  When season controls are added to the model, this effect is still negative, 
although it is no longer significant (B= -0.62, p= 0.217), suggesting that it is season 
changes in penalties that is driving the relationship between past punishment and current 
rule infractions at the league level.   
 Focusing now on the control variables, when post season is added in as a control, 
the relationships between the independent variable and dependent variable remain the 
same and post season has the expected relationship with current penalties.  A post-season 
game has 61.14 fewer penalties each week than a regular season game (p=0.000).  In 
model 3 with season controls, moving from regular season to a post season game 
decreases the number of penalties  per week by 66.95 (p=0.000).  Even with the control 
5 Each of the models at the league and team level have several hypothesis tests in the 
model that presume independence and  could result in alpha inflation, but due to the lack 
of significant findings, this does not appear to be an issue. 
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for games per week, these coefficients take into account a decrease in penalties due to a 
decrease in the number of games.  For that reason, it is useful to interpret the average 
penalties per game measure in order to determine the true effect of the post season.  As 
shown by Model 2 in Appendix C, a post season game results in a decrease of 2.32 
average penalties per game (p= 0.000).  This suggests that either players are committing 
fewer penalties during the post-season or that the referees are calling fewer penalties.   
Season and week dummy variables are where there are more statistically 
significant results.  For the season dummy variables, the results illustrate that there are 
statistically significant differences in penalties from season to season, specifically in 
seasons 2001, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, and 2008.  The largest differences above and 
below the average season appear during season 2005 with 27.51 penalties a week above 
the average season (p=0.000) and in 2007 with 21.34 penalties a week below the average 
season (p=0.001).  Surprisingly, these changes are not happening during expected times.  
For example, there is not effect of the New Orleans Bounty scandal in the years 2009-
2011, and there is not a significant change in the number of penalties during the helmet to 
helmet crackdown in 2010. 
The week results also show an interesting trend: the end of the season appears to 
have a lower number of penalties when compared to the average week.  Specifically, in 
the last two weeks before the post season, there are the least number of penalties with a 
decrease of over 40 penalties compared to the average week of penalties (p=0.000).  
 In sum, while the initial analyses show evidence that fines have a small deterrent 
effect, upon including season effects as a control, there is no evidence of a deterrent 
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effect of penalties or fines at the league level independent of season effects.  The next 




Table 2. League Analyses: Dependent Variable Penalties per Week 


















Previous Penalties .07** .06* .001 0.39*** 0.04 
Previous Fines -1.34** -1.43* -0.62 -1.08* -0.56 
Games Per Week 14.41*** 9.75*** 9.78*** 15.36*** 15.57*** 
Post Season  -61.14*** -66.95*** 0 2.86 
2000      
2001   -18.25**  -17.59** 
2002   7.03  4.40 
2003   5.85  3.28 
2004   23.27***  20.03** 
2005   27.51***  24.11*** 
2006   -14.72*  -16.51** 
2007   21.34**  -22.92*** 
2008   -19.65**  -21.30** 
2009   -10.90  -12.94* 
2010   -7.99  -10.18 
2011   -0.14  -2.51 
2012   -0.93  -3.44 
Week 1    69.14*** -6.37 
Week 2    -11.75 -3.99 
Week 3    -10.46 0.13 
Week 4    -17.90* -10.67 
Week 5      
Week 6    -7.08 -5.63 
Week 7    -6.18 -8.28 
Week 8    -12.51 -14.98* 
Week 9    -3.42 -8.27 
Week 10    -12.74 -13.86 
Week 11    -13.00 -12.51 
Week 12    -21.79* -16.55 
Week 13    -35.00** -28.34** 
Week 14    -31.10** -28.67** 
Week 15    -29.47** -27.61** 
Week 16    -42.93*** -40.59*** 
Week 17    -40.64*** -42.99*** 
Week 18 (post)    -18.13 -20.87 
Week 19 (post)    46.51 -12.67 
Week 20 (post)    51.63 -6.36 
Week 21  (post)    66.64 0.00 




 See Table 3 below for the violent penalty results.  The relationships in the violent 
penalties analyses follow largely the same trends as the all penalty analyses with some 
slight variations.  The similarity is that there are small statistically significant 
relationships between prior penalties and current rule infractions and prior fines and 
current rule infractions in the models with no controls, post season control, and week 
controls, but adding seasons to the model removes the significance and reduces the effect.  
The main differences are with the effect of post season and the number of significant 
seasons.   
 Like the all penalty analyses, the initial model shows support for deterrence 
theory with fines: each additional fine in the previous week leads to a reduction in 0.36 
penalties each week (p=0.008).  On average there are 447 violent penalties a week, 
resulting in a 0.08% reduction in violent penalties.  Again, as with the all-penalty model, 
the effect of previous penalties has a slightly positive effect across all models, but this 
effect approaches zero and looses statistical significance in the final model (p=0.662) 
 Exploring the control variables in this model adds additional interesting findings 
to the model.  Like the all penalty analysis, post season is a negative relationship with 
current rule infractions, but it is not a significant relationship.  The magnitude of the 
effect is also much smaller: moving from a regular season game to a post season game is 
related to a decline in 6.19 violent penalties per week as opposed to decrease in 61 of all 
penalties (or as shown by Appendices C and D, accounting for the decrease in games 
during the post season, a decrease of 0.02 average violent penalties per game as opposed 
to 2.32 average penalties per game of all types).  The season dummy variables again 
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imply that there are variations over time in commission of penalties, although for violent 
penalties this is only the case in two seasons: 2007 and 2008.  In both of these seasons 
there was a decrease in violent penalties compared to the average season: in 2007, a 
decrease of 7.86 penalties per week (p=0.000) and in 2008, a decrease in 6.42 penalties 
per week (p=0.002).  Again this suggests that either players are more consistent in their 
commission of violent penalties or that referees are more consistent in their calling of 
violent penalties, or perhaps, both.  In addition, this indicates that there is some change in 
season 2007 and 2008 that resulted in a change in the number of penalties. 
 The week results for violent fines show the greatest differences from the all fine 
analyses.  While there does appear to be variation by week in penalties, it is slightly 
different.  Instead of a significant decrease at the end of the season, there is a significant 
increase in the middle of the season and the end of the season does is not significantly 
differ from the average.  In the model with only week control variables, the post season 
consistently has a higher number of penalties than the average.  In the regular season 
there are significant differences in weeks 1, 3, 5, 7, 8, and 9. 
 In sum, the results for the violent penalties at the league level appear to be fairly 
consistent with the results for all penalties: there does not appear to be evidence of a 
deterrent effect of penalties or fines independent of season effects.  There may be 
deterrence occurring as a result of season changes, but future research will need to be 




Table 3. League Analyses: Dependent Variable Violent Penalties per Week 


















.09* .09* 0.00 0.21*** -0.03 
Previous Fines -0.36** -0.37** -0.27 -0.38** -0.31 
Games Per Week 2.26*** 1.78*** 1.86*** 3.81*** 3.93*** 
Post Season  -6.19 -6.76 0 25.15* 
2000        
2001   -1.84  -1.86 
2002   2.33  1.63 
2003   1.81  1.10 
2004   2.16  1.45 
2005   0.19  -0.57 
2006   -1.81  -2.63 
2007   -7.86***  -8.81*** 
2008   -6.42**  -7.32*** 
2009   -3.29  -4.08* 
2010   -2.65   -3.38 
2011   3.33   2.66 
2012   2.08   1.50 
Week 1    7.84* -0.20 
Week 2    3.62 4.01 
Week 3    7.89** 8.92** 
Week 4    4.12 5.49 
Week 5    6.92* 6.87* 
Week 6    4.64 4.72 
Week 7    7.84* 7.08* 
Week 8     6.48* 6.39* 
Week 9    6.66* 6.44* 
Week 10    5.64 5.60* 
Week 11    3.22 3.49 
Week 12    1.61 2.10 
Week 13    -0.76 -0.31 
Week 14      
Week 15    2.90 2.89 
Week 16    -2.58 -1.89 
Week 17    0.70 0.23 
Week 18 (post)    17.15 -6.37 
Week 19 (post)    24.27* -5.81 
Week 20 (post)    27.93* -1.60 






 See Table 4 below for results for the all penalty team analyses.  Focusing on the 
independent variables of interest across all models suggests that there is no deterrent 
effect of penalties and fines independent of season or week effect.  The team analyses 
look similar to the league analyses.  The effect of previous punishment is significant 
across all models and is positive, suggesting that an increase in previous penalties at the 
team level the previous week leads to very small increases in penalties in the current 
week.  This effect diminishes when season control variables are included in the model or 
when team control variables are included in the model.  Given that the model with 
season, week, and team dummies reduces the effect of prior penalties to almost zero 
(B=0.03, p=0.019), the results suggest that there is little to no effect of previous penalties 
on current penalties and variations in penalties can likely be explained by other factors. 
 Fines, on the other hand, as with the league analyses, have an effect in the 
expected direction, but the effect is not significant when season dummy variables are 
included in the model (B=-0.01, p=0.522).  Similar to the league analyses, it appears that 
any decrease in penalties due to fines is actually a season variation in penalties.   
 The direction of the effect for the control variables is consistent across models 
with the magnitude only changing slightly.  All relationships except one are statistically 
significant.  A bye game the week before significantly leads to an increase in penalties, a 
home game leads to a decrease in penalties, a conference game leads to an increase in 
penalties, and a win the week before leads to a decrease in penalties.  These findings 
suggest that other informal costs and benefits and decision-making factors are likely 
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influencing penalty commission.  In addition, referee behavior may be influencing some 
of these variables like home game (Moskowitz and Wertheim, 2011).   
 The season, week, and team dummy variables tell a slightly more complicated 
story.  The results for the season dummy variables follow the league-level results in that 
it appears that there is variation in the number of penalties in each season with significant 
differences in 2001 and 2004-2010.  The largest difference is in 2005 with an increase of 
0.98 penalty penalties per team per game (p=0.000).  The average number of penalties 
per team per game is 7.23 therefore this is a 13.39% increase.  These findings again 
suggest that it is important to determine what happened in these seasons to cause these 
changes.  The week dummy variables also show the same effects as the league analyses: 
penalties decrease at the end of the season.  Weeks with below average penalties begin in 
week 12 and continue into the post season.  It will be useful for future research to 
determine if player or referee behavior is changing.  The team dummy variables also 
suggest that there are team differences in penalties.  For example, Oakland commits 1.7 
(p=0.000) more penalties per game than the average team.  This is especially surprising 
because of the 13 year time span of the data.  In sum, as with the league analyses, there is 
no evidence of deterrent effects of penalties and fines independent of season and team 




Table 4. Team Analyses: Dependent Variable Penalties per Game per Team 
(OLS, Betas Reported, N=6,898) 
























0.09*** 0.09*** 0.06*** 0.1*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.03* 
Previous 
Fines 
-0.04*** -0.04*** -0.01 -0.05*** -0.04*** -0.01 -0.01 
Lag Bye 
Game 
 0.42** 0.44** 0.40* 0.44** 0.41** 0.41** 
Home 
Game 
 -0.50*** -0.50*** -0.50*** -0.50*** -0.49*** -0.49*** 
Conference 
Game 
 0.16* 0.17* 0.18* 0.15* 0.19* 0.19* 
Lag Win  -0.28*** -0.28*** -0.14 -0.20** -0.17* -0.11 
2000        
2001   -0.67***   -0.66** -0.68*** 
2002   0.21   0.22 0.24 
2003   0.17   0.18 0.20 
2004   0.81***   0.82*** 0.87*** 
2005   0.98***   0.98*** 1.04*** 
2006   -0.58**   -0.57** -0.56** 
2007   -0.84***   -0.82*** -0.83*** 
2008   -0.79***   -0.77*** -0.79*** 
2009   -0.50*   -0.47* -0.47* 
2010   -0.40*   -0.38 -0.35 
2011   -0.03   -0.02 0.00 
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2012   -0.16   -0.12 -0.10 
Week 1    0.18  -0.02 -0.29 
Week 2    -0.07  -0.06 -0.08 
Week 3    0.06  0.07 0.07 
Week 4    -0.34  -0.38 -0.39 
Week 5          
Week 6    -0.19  -0.23 -0.24 
Week 7    -0.31  -0.36 -0.38 
Week 8     -0.57*  -0.58* -0.61** 
Week 9    -0.30  -0.32 -0.35 
Week 10    -0.50*  -0.49* -0.51* 
Week 11    -0.42  -0.41 -0.43* 
Week 12    -0.40  -0.47* -0.49* 
Week 13    -0.87***  -0.85*** -0.88*** 
Week 14    -0.82***  -0.86*** -0.89*** 
Week 15    -0.75**  -0.79*** -0.83*** 
Week 16    -1.17***  -1.20*** -1.24*** 
Week 17    -1.24***  -1.29*** -1.34*** 
Week 18 
(post) 
   -1.91***  -1.89*** -1.84*** 
Week 19 
(post) 
   -1.70***  -1.71*** -1.74*** 
Week 20 
(post) 
   -1.63***  -1.63*** -1.66*** 
Week 21  
(post) 
   -0.85  -0.84 -0.83 
ARI     0.56  0.58* 
ATL     -0.55  -0.59* 
BAL     0.47  0.54 
BUF     0.01  -0.03 
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CAR     0.02  0.00 
CHI     -0.19  -0.20 
CIN     -0.04  -0.07 
CLE     -0.06  -0.10 
DAL     0.59*  0.59* 
DEN     -0.25  -0.29 
DET     0.85**  0.86** 
GB     0.00  0.03 
HOU     0.13  0.07 
IND     -1.09***  -1.09*** 
JAC     -0.27  -0.30 
KC     -0.39  -0.42 
MIA     -0.17  -0.19 
MIN     0.71  0.72* 
NE     -0.56  -0.54 
NO     0.25  0.27 
NYG     0.12  0.14 
NYJ     -1.10***  -1.12*** 
OAK     1.69***  1.74*** 
PHI     0.56  0.62* 
PIT     -0.47  -0.46 
SD        
SEA     -0.40  -0.41 
SF     0.18  0.17 
STL     0.46  0.46 
TB     0.22  0.21 
TEN     0.83**  0.83** 
WAS     0.16  0.13 




 See Table 5 below for the results for the violent penalty team analyses.  The 
results of the primary independent variables for the violent penalty team analyses are 
largely the same as the all penalties team analyses and the league level analyses.  
Previous violent penalties are related to a slight increase in current violent penalties, 
although once all the controls are included in the model, the effect is no longer significant 
and the effect drops to close to zero.  Of particular note in these analyses are the 
differences between the violent penalty analyses and the all penalty analyses.  The first 
difference is that none of the controls are statistically significant in any of the models.  
This suggests that violent penalties are less influenced by outside forces such as 
opponents and schedules.  Again, the question remains whether this is player behavior or 
referee behavior. 
 The season dummy variables again show variation in the number of violent 
penalties between seasons, but like the league analyses, shows that there much less 
variation.  The two main seasons that show a decrease in violent penalties are consistent 
with the league analyses: 2007 (IRR=0.74, p=0.000) and 2008 (IRR= 0.79, p= 0.000).  
The week dummy variables do not show the same decreasing trend as the all penalty 
analysis suggesting again that violent penalties are more consistent week to week.  There 
is some team variation in penalty commission, but there is less variation.  Tennessee and 
Detroit have the greatest increase in the rate of penalties per game over the average team 
with an increase of 27% (Detroit p=0.008, Tennessee p=0.006).  All of these results point 
to their being less variation in violent penalties than with all penalties.  The next chapter 





Table 5. Team Analyses: Dependent Variable Violent Penalties per Game per Team 



























1.04** 1.04*** 1.03* 1.04** 1.02* 1.02* 1.01 
Previous Fines 0.99** 0.99** 0.99 0.99** 0.99** 0.99 0.99* 
Lag Bye Game  1.08 1.08 1.07 1.08 1.08 1.07 
Home Game  0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96 
Conference 
Game 
 1.03 1.03 1.03 1.03 1.03 1.03 
Lag Win  0.99 0.99 0.99 1.00 0.99 1.00 
2000        
2001   0.95   0.95 0.95 
2002   1.07   1.08 1.08 
2003   1.06   1.06 1.06 
2004   1.07   1.07 1.07 
2005   1.00   1.01 1.01 
2006   0.94   0.94 0.95 
2007   0.74***   0.74*** 0.74*** 
2008   0.79***   0.79*** 0.79*** 
2009   0.89*   0.89 0.90 
2010   0.90   0.91 0.92 
2011   1.11   1.11 1.12* 
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2012   1.07   1.08 1.09 
Week 1    1.05  1.04 1.03 
Week 2    1.11  1.11 1.11 
Week 3    1.22**  1.23** 1.23** 
Week 4    1.07  1.06 1.07 
Week 5    1.10  1.10 1.11 
Week 6    1.02  1.02 1.01 
Week 7    1.10  1.10 1.10 
Week 8     1.07  1.07 1.07 
Week 9    1.09  1.09 1.09 
Week 10    1.09  1.09 1.09 
Week 11    1.07  1.08 1.08 
Week 12    1.06  1.06 1.06 
Week 13    0.98  0.98 0.98 
Week 14        
Week 15    1.09  1.09 1.09 
Week 16    0.94  0.94 0.94 
Week 17    1.01  1.01 1.01 
Week 18 (post)    0.78*  0.78* 0.80 
Week 19 (post)    0.92  0.92 0.92 
Week 20 (post)    1.03  1.04 1.03 
Week 21  (post)    0.99  1.00 0.99 
ARI     1.09  1.09 
ATL     0.97  0.97 
BAL     1.11  1.12 
BUF     0.93  0.92 
CAR     1.08  1.08 
CHI     0.95  0.95 
CIN     0.88  0.88 
CLE     0.94  0.93 
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DAL     1.00  1.00 
DEN     1.02  1.02 
DET     1.27**  1.27** 
GB     0.94  0.94 
HOU     0.99  0.99 
IND     0.74**  0.75** 
JAC        
KC     0.88  0.87 
MIA     0.98  0.98 
MIN     0.97  0.97 
NE     0.98  0.98 
NO     1.03  1.03 
NYG     1.11  1.12 
NYJ     0.85  0.85 
OAK     1.18  1.18 
PHI     1.13  1.14 
PIT     0.84  0.84 
SD     0.96  0.96 
SEA     0.78*  0.78* 
SF     1.01  1.00 
STL     1.02  1.02 
TB     1.12  1.12 
TEN     1.27**  1.28** 
WAS     0.97  0.97 
*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001  
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CHAPTER 6: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
 In this dissertation, I have attempted to add to the deterrence literature by 
providing an empirical analysis of rule breaking behavior over 13 years within a unique 
environment, the National Football League.  Deterrence literature until this point has 
been either cross sectional or relied mostly on student samples and scenario based data.  
Prior research has found limited support for deterrence theory with the greatest support 
for certainty, little support for severity, and very little research on celerity.  This 
dissertation sought to address limitations in previous literature by exploring general 
deterrence in a 13 year dataset at both the team and league levels.  In addition, by 
utilizing a dataset that enforces punishment almost immediately for all on field behavior 
and very swiftly for all fines, this research addresses criticism raised by other researchers 
that the evidence for deterrence theory is not strong because punishment does not happen 
swiftly enough (Paternoster, 2010).  This research addresses the following four 
hypotheses: 
 
H1: Past punishments will reduce the number of current rule infractions. 
H2: Past fines will reduce the number of current rule infractions. 
H3: Past punishments for violent behavior will reduce the number of current 
violent rule infractions. 




To explore these hypotheses I utilized data created from existing data sources online: a 
play-by-play dataset and a fine dataset.  This section will review the relevant results and 
discuss the implications of these findings. 
 
SUMMARY OF RESEARCH FINDINGS 
 The results are fairly consistent through all the team, league, all penalty, and 
violent penalty analyses.  This section will review the results and focus on some 
important differences between the different models.  In general, this research did not 
support the hypotheses and therefore deterrence theory is not supported by the imposition 
of penalties and fines.  Despite the general findings, the nuances of the results tell a 
slightly complicated story.   
 In all models except for one (Table 3, Model 5) previous punishments is related to 
an increase in current rule infractions.  For both the team and league analysis, this effect 
approaches zero and loses statistical significance when controls are included in the 
model.  This suggests that the variation in current penalties is not explained by past 
penalties, but instead may be explained by variation in season, week, or team and as 
mentioned does not provide support for deterrence theory. 
 The effects of fines are also consistent across all models, although for fines it is a 
negative relationship: each additional fine the week before leads a decrease in penalties.  
Again, the effect reduces in magnitude and loses significance with the addition of control 
variables, suggesting that while the direction supports deterrence theory, the effect is 
likely driven by opponent, schedule, season or team. 
 Focusing on the control variable results illuminates some of the nuances of the 
results.  The control variables are not consistent across all models and deserve further 
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discussion.  In the all penalty models, some of the controls that deserve discussion are 
post season, lag bye, home game and conference game.  Each of these controls are 
significant in the models with seasons or weeks as controls, suggesting that these have an 
effect independent of seasons or weeks.  Post season leads to a decrease in the number of 
penalties.  It is possible that this is due to an increased cost of committing penalties.  
Perhaps players are more careful about their behavior in the post season due to concern 
about the cost of committing penalties.  It is also possible that referees are calling fewer 
penalties in the post season in order to keep the game flowing.  Similarly, at the team 
level, all of the controls except lag win are significant in the all penalty model (lag bye, 
home game, and conference game).  The increase in penalties the week following a bye 
week possibly suggests that players are out of practice at refraining from committing 
penalties or they feel that the benefits of coming out strong with many penalties outweigh 
the costs of committing penalties.  There is a decrease in the number of penalties in a 
home game.  This could be that the informal costs and benefits are greater with a home 
crowd or that the referees call fewer penalties for the home team (Moskowitz and 
Wertheim, 2011).  Finally, there are more penalties for a conference game.  This finding 
provides support for the hypothesis provided by Loewenstein and colleagues (1997), 
suggesting that when emotions are high in a conference game, players may be less 
deterrable and be more likely to commit a greater number of penalties.    
Another findings for the control variables that is interesting to discuss is that the 
controls have statistically significant relationships with current penalties in the all penalty 
models, but not the violent penalty models.  This suggests that violent penalties are not as 
influenced by outside factors as all penalties are.  This dissertation suggests that there are 
four main reasons that violent penalties may not be affected by these control variables.  
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Two of the explanations are based on changing player behavior and two are based on 
referee behavior.  First, player decision-making may be different for violent penalties.  
For example, it could be that these penalties are expressive or impulsive as opposed to 
instrumental and therefore are subject to different decision-making processes (as 
suggested by Loughran et al. (2011a) with face-to-face crimes and Chambliss (1967) and 
Zimring and Hawkins (1973)).  Second, it could be that for violent penalties, the cost and 
benefit calculus is different.  A player who tackles a quarterback after the whistle 
(resulting in injury to the quarterback) faces very different consequences (good and bad) 
than a player who steps offside during the snap.  Third, it could be that referees are more 
vigilant in their consistency of calling violent penalties.  They may see violent penalties 
as more important to keeping the game under control or they may be receiving outside 
pressure to control violent penalties.  Finally, it may only be that violent penalties are 
easier for a referee to see.  
 The week, season, and team controls also do not have a consistent effect across all 
models.  One consistent finding is that there is an effect for each of these controls 
suggesting that current penalties vary based on something that is happening during a 
particular season, week, or for a specific team.  One finding that is consistent across all 
models is that in seasons 2007 and 2008, there was a decrease in penalties.  The 
magnitude and significance level varies slightly depending on the model, but these 
seasons will be important to look at in future research.  It is likely that something league 
wide occurred that affected the number of penalties.  Future research will have to 
determine if this was a deterrent effect (for example as the result of a crackdown) or if it 
was some enforcement change (for example, the removal of a particular category of 
penalty).   
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 The week control variables tell a less consistent story.  The effect of the week 
depends on the model, therefore the main summary that can be taken from these findings 
is that weeks matter, further exploration needs to be done about what the effect is and 
why that effect occurs.  It is possible that weeks vary so much from season to season that 
they are not a useful avenue to explore over 13 years.   
 Team, on the other hand has a more consistent effect.  It does appear that certain 
teams affect the number of penalties that occur in a given week.  For example, Oakland 
has 1.74 more penalties than average each game, the New York Jets have 1.12 fewer 
penalties per game, Tennessee has 0.32 more violent penalties each game than average, 
and Indiana has .29 fewer violent penalties per game than the average team.  This is 
especially surprising given the length of time that this dataset encompasses.  The fact that 
a particular team has more or less penalties over a 13 year period suggests some 
mechanism is present other than deterrence.  There are two main explanations for the 
team variation.  First, these differences are based on a culture within the team over 13 
years similar to a subculture of violence where different rules or norms are expected for a 
certain group in certain situations (Wolfgang and Ferracuti, 1982).  Recent evidence of a 
team employing certain rule-breaking behavior is the Seattle Seahawks’ use of pass 
interference at a much higher level than any other team during the 2013 season (Clark 
and Clegg, 2014).  This strategy may have been so successful that it helped them win the 
Super Bowl.  The second explanation is that  the referees or the league determine that 
these teams are more penalty prone and therefore call more penalties against them, 
similar to a labeling perspective where the punishers define the person being punished as 
bad (Tannenbaum, 1938).  In sum, while there is no evidence of a deterrent effect of 
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penalties or fines independent of the control variables, these results do provide interesting 
policy and theoretical implications in addition to avenues for future research. 
 
IMPLICATIONS FOR THEORY AND POLICY 
 The implications of this dissertation for deterrence theory are in line with prior 
deterrence research.  There is no evidence of a deterrent effect suggesting that 
punishment that is swift and certain does not prevent future rule-breaking for the time 
period studied within the NFL.  This lack of finding could be for several different reasons 
suggested by prior research.  For example, it could be that because NFL players are 
playing in a state of high emotion and high testosterone, they are in a visceral state.  
Therefore, prior literature would suggest that NFL players are more likely to commit 
penalties while in a “hot state” (Lowenstein et al., 1997).  Although Lowenstein and 
colleagues (1997) do not suggest a mediating effect of arousal, they do suggest that 
arousal may affect how a person weighs costs and benefits.  This would translate to the 
NFL by reducing the expected effect of penalties and fines due to the hot state of football 
players. 
 In addition, it is possible that the type of punishment is not “proportionately 
severe” and therefore, is not a successful deterrent.  Given this population is well-
informed about the punishment and they are continuously experiencing the punishment, it 
is possible that a more severe punishment would result in a deterrent effect.  This is in 
concordance with the research on three strikes laws.  Specifically, Helland and Taborrok 
(2007) found a 17-20% decrease of arrests for those individuals who already had two 
strikes.  Likewise, it is possible that in the NFL, a threat of ejection after a certain number 
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of penalties (like in soccer) would be a more effective deterrent than the penalty system 
as it is currently enforced.     
 As with most research on theory, instead of completely refuting deterrence theory, 
this dissertation suggests changes or further modifications of the theory (Wallace, 1971).  
Recent research has subsumed deterrence theory within rational choice theory and this 
dissertation suggests more work within that direction.  While prior punishment did not 
affect rule-breaking behavior, the control variables did.   
 The controls variables included in the models served as a limited proxy for other 
rational choice and decision-making variables and suggest that further work should be 
done in this area.  The control variables all assume that a different deterrence process 
may be occurring based on the circumstances of a particular game.  For example, all the 
controls may provide information about player’s decision making process and whether 
they are loss aversive or loss seeking (i.e. in a game after a win, a player may be more 
conservative in their penalty commission).  This is in support of current rational choice 
literature that finds that whether a person is facing a loss or a gain affects decision 
making (e.g. Loughran et al, 2011a).  In addition, a particular opponent (conference 
game) or location (home game) may be measuring rational choice by including different 
informal costs and benefits that are present like prestige within the conference or loud fan 
participation at a home game.  Because these variables are only crude measures of 
decision-making and rational choice variables and do not directly measure informal costs 
and benefits, this research cannot draw any conclusions about decision-making or rational 
choice, but the consistency of the significance in the all penalty models does suggest that 
it would be worthwhile to explore these theoretical models more explicitly.  In sum, this 
research does not support traditional deterrence theory, but does suggest that current and 
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future lines of research exploring rational choice and decision-making processes other 
than formal sanctions is a useful line of inquiry.  
 Policy implications stemming from this research can be divided into two 
categories: 1) those directly relevant to football and 2) those that are relevant for the 
criminal justice system.  Within football, given that the stated goal of penalties is to 
change behavior and particularly to make the game safer and that this research does not 
show support for this goal, it may be necessary to change the goal of punishment.  
Perhaps a better goal would be to maintain player or fan satisfaction with the equity of 
the game as opposed to attempting to change behavior (similar to police foot patrol 
increasing satisfaction with the police rather than crime reduction (Pate et al., 1986)).  
Penalties do not appear to change behavior for violent or all penalties and in fact, may 
actually increase the undesirable behavior.   
 In regards to fines, the policy implications are a little less clear.  It appears that 
fines may have a slight deterrent effect, but because the effect is so weak and the 
statistical significance is not consistent, it is important not to make any policy changes 
based on these results, but instead to conduct further research.  For example, the NFL 
would be wise to explore in more detail when and why fines work to fully optimize the 
use of fines as a deterrent mechanism.  Specifically, it may be useful for the NFL to take 
taking into account player income (like day fines within the criminal justice system 
(Hillsman and Green, 1991).  This would allow the NFL to address the criticism that the 
NFL players make so much money, that fines, as they are currently enforced, may not be 




 Finally, and most important for this dissertation, there are several policy 
implications for the criminal justice system.  As previously mentioned, any criminal 
justice system implications from this research must be taken with a healthy amount of 
skepticism.  While the comparison to the criminal justice system is an apt comparison 
and the data are an especially useful way explore deterrence theory, this is not the 
criminal justice system and therefore results should be applied with caution.  That being 
said, given that prior research on deterrence concludes that at best there is mild support 
for deterrence theory, this research adds to that body of research while addressing some 
of the limitations of prior research.  Specifically, Paternoster (2010) suggested that the 
expected deterrent effect may not be evident because punishment in the criminal justice 
system does not happen fast enough.  Since this research explored punishment that is 
almost always enforced immediately, combining this research with prior deterrence 
research raises questions about the use of punishment within the criminal justice system 
as a method of deterrence.  Even with these findings, it is worth exploring the results of 
the fines in this research in combination with fine research in the criminal justice system.  
Some research has supported the use of a day fines system where offenders are fined 
based on their salary (Hillsman and Green, 1991) while others caution against the use of 
the fine and fee system used in the criminal justice system in many jurisdictions in the 
United States (Becket and Harris, 2011).  Again, the fine results are not strong enough to 
make changes, but with further research exploring a fine system may be a worthwhile 
approach. 
 In sum, this research, with a lack of support for deterrence theory combines with 
prior literature to question the veracity of a strict deterrence model within the criminal 
justice system.  Instead, the consistency of significant control variables that take into 
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account other factors such as informal costs and benefits (e.g. the benefit of a loud crowd 
at a home game, or the risky behavior of penalty commission in the game after a win) 
suggests future research should continue to take into account these informal costs and 
benefits with rational choice and decision-making models.  Due to these findings, this 
dissertation suggests that the NFL reevaluate the goals of their punishment and that the 
criminal justice system explore different options for punishment other than formal 
punishment as a strict deterrence model. 
 
FUTURE RESEARCH 
 There are several areas of future research that will be useful to explore.  First, and 
perhaps the most natural extension, is to explore more combinations of the measures 
included in this dissertation.  It is possible that the fines and penalties are working 
completely independently and should be tested by including them in separate models.  
Or, it is possible that they are working together more and should be run as interactions.  
Likewise, it may be that seasons are working in interaction with the independent 
variables or other controls.  This dissertation did not test every possible combination of 
the variables and therefore a good next step would be to explore some of these other 
options.   
 Second, and also directly relevant, is to determine what changes occurred during 
the seasons when there were consistent changes in penalties.  This is particularly 
important to the theoretical implications because if there is a particular rule change or 
some sort of enforcement change, the results may be applicable to the criminal justice 
system.  For example, if the season effect had occurred in 2010, as expected with the 
helmet to helmet crackdown, these results would have suggested that the crackdown had 
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a deterrent effect (which would be most obviously applicable to police crackdowns).  
Because the changes occurred in season with no known major changes more research 
needs to be conducted.  The changes could have been a result of changes in 2006: new 
commissioner, horse-collar rule expanded, low hits against the passer prohibited or 
changes in 2007 and 2008: high definition replay and incidental face mask penalty 
removed.  Each one of these changes could have had an effect on penalties and the effect 
may determine whether deterrence is at work or some other mechanism. 
 Another extension of this research will be to attempt to disentangle player 
behavior from referee behavior.  This is a similar challenge faced in the criminal justice 
system when trying to determine whether police behavior or actual crime levels change.  
One helpful step to address this issue would be to include referee information in the 
dataset.  For example, knowing who the referees were and when they were in the league 
may help address some of the changes.  In addition, exploring the first weeks of 2012 in 
which substitute referees were utilized may help shed some light on this issue.  Finally, a 
statistical technique may be used to address this issue, similar to the way instrumental 
variables have been used in some policing research (Levitt, 1997). 
 Fourth, an important step in this research is to access player perceptions.  As 
noted in prior deterrence research, there is a gap between perceptions of punishment and 
actual punishment (Gibbs, 1975).  Although the NFL allows perceptions to be as close as 
possible to objective deterrence it is likely not a perfect match.  Therefore, interviews 
with players will help address this connection.  In addition, interviews with players will 
provide measures of the informal costs and benefits that are not measured it this 
dissertation allowing the model to be expanded to the more recent rational choice model. 
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 Next, exploring the fine results with more nuance would be an important step.  
The fine result, while not strong is an interesting result to explore from a deterrence 
perspective.  For example, it may be possible to explore severity of fine by looking at 
variation in monetary amount.  Also, with the addition of more fines over time, it may be 
possible to split fines by offense type to determine if fines are more effective for certain 
offenses.  Fines could also be explored in other sports.  For example, the use of the fine 
has increased in the NBA, with league officials claiming that it is effective (Keh, 2013).  
Given that the leveling of fines is a method of punishment that is used in the criminal 
justice system, this is a particularly useful line of research.    
Sixth, an individual-level analysis of this data will be a fruitful future direction for 
this research to take.  To my knowledge, no individual level longitudinal deterrence 
research has been conducted generally or within sports and thus, this would be an 
addition to the field.  In addition, this would allow for the possible identification of 
particular deterrables or incorrigibales as suggested by Pogarsky (2002); perhaps certain 
players moving in and out of the league are driving certain relationships.  An individual 
level analysis would add to the deterrence literature information about particular 
individuals and whether there are individual differences that lead a person to be more 
likely to be deterred. 
 Finally, while this data is a useful comparison to the criminal justice system and 
has many strengths as discussed, it remains that it is not criminal justice data.  It would be 
useful to replicate this study within the criminal justice system.  A longitudinal dataset 
with arrests would be a good place to start to determine the effect of prior arrest on the 
future likelihood of arrest.  If the results from this dissertation are supported within the 
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 Deterrence theory has been explored in many ways throughout the history of the 
theory, but was traditionally done by cross-sectional official data or more recently with 
scenario based studies using primarily student samples.  This dissertation sought to 
address the gap in the literature by using data from the National Football League over 13 
years.  There are several advantages of these data including a variation and detail in 
punishment, the direct effect of punishment is more easily observed, punishment happens 
immediately in almost all circumstances on the field, and perceptions are as close to 
actual punishment as possible.  Within football, players are made aware of all punishment 
within the game that they play in, they are made aware of many other penalties in other 
games through game tape, news media, or through coaches, teammates, or friends, and 
finally, if there are any changes in enforcement, they are notified by multiple sources.  
The best example of this is the recent helmet-to-helmet crackdown where players were 
notified of the change in newspaper articles that were written about the crackdown (e.g. 
Battista, 2010), a memo sent to teams from the NFL commissioner, a video in order to 
put them “on notice” (Anderson, 2010), and several large fines.  While, not all 
punishment is as well publicized, football is a situation in which actors at the very least 
have perceptions that are more aligned to actual punishment than the average citizen’s 
perceptions about laws and law enforcement. 
 In addition to the inherent strengths of these data, prior research has applied sports 
to topics outside of sports taking advantage of the controlled real world laboratories that 
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sports typically are (McCormick and Tollison, 1984; Moskowitz and Wertheim, 2011; 
Togler, 2009).  With this dataset and improvements over past research, this dissertation 
sought to find support for general deterrence and specifically explored whether prior 
punishment affected current rule infractions.  In sum, this dissertation did not find 
support for the hypotheses and thus, did not find support for punishment as a deterrent 
independent of control variables.   
 Even though there was limited to no support for deterrence theory, there was 
evidence of some other factors affecting the current rule breaking behavior like season, 
record, opponent, teams, and week.  These findings suggest that future research should 
explore further the different factors that may be affecting penalty commission in an 
attempt to better understand whether institutional or personal factors may be affecting 
rule breaking behavior.  These results also suggest that the criminal justice system should 
continue to be wary of increasing punishment to change behavior and instead should 
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Appendix C: League Analysis. Dependent Variable Average Penalties per Game 


















Penalties 0.16*** 0.12** 0.05 0.41*** 0.15 
Previous Fines -0.04 -0.10* -0.03 -0.07 -0.03 
Post Season  -2.32*** -2.33*** -2.32** -3.79*** 
2000      
2001   -1.56*  -1.41 
2002   0.23  0.20 
2003   0.28  0.29 
2004   0.88  0.77 
2005   1.34*  1.17 
2006   -1.40*  -1.26 
2007   -2.06**  -1.88 
2008   -1.12  -0.99 
2009   -1.18  -1.11 
2010   -0.89  -0.82 
2011   -0.78  -0.73 
2012   -0.86  -0.81 
Week 1    5.14*** 1.25 
Week 2    -0.18 -0.18 
Week 3    -0.07 0.06 
Week 4    -0.99 -0.82 
Week 5      
Week 6    -0.67 -0.54 
Week 7    -0.68 -0.68 
Week 8     -1.15 -1.13 
Week 9    -0.43 -0.55 
Week 10    -1.03 -0.98 
Week 11    -0.73 -0.76 
Week 12    -0.91 -1.01 
Week 13    -1.63* -1.69* 
Week 14    -1.38 -1.66* 
Week 15    -1.28 -1.59* 
Week 16    -2.11** -2.40** 
Week 17    -1.98* -2.49** 
Week 18 (post)    -1.00 0.00 
Week 19 (post)    0.00 0.66 
Week 20 (post)    -0.42 0.37 
Week 21  (post)    1.26 1.98** 
*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001  
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Appendix D. League Analysis. Dependent Variable Average Violent Penalties per Game 


















Penalties 0.13* 0.12* 0.06 0.17* 0.05 
Previous Fines -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.03 
Post Season  -0.30** -0.31** -0.10 -0.06 
2000      
2001   -0.13  -0.13 
2002   0.27  0.27 
2003   0.05  0.05 
2004   0.07  0.07 
2005   -0.06  -0.06 
2006   -0.07  -0.08 
2007   -0.50*  -0.50* 
2008   -0.10  -0.10 
2009   -0.13  -0.13 
2010   -0.11  -0.11 
2011   0.14  0.14 
2012   0.30  0.31 
Week 1    0.40 0.13 
Week 2    0.22 0.22 
Week 3    0.44 0.47 
Week 4    0.09 0.16 
Week 5    0.23 0.24 
Week 6    0.02 0.06 
Week 7    0.24 0.25 
Week 8     0.14 0.16 
Week 9    0.19 0.21 
Week 10    0.17 0.19 
Week 11    0.14 0.16 
Week 12    0.10 0.14 
Week 13    -0.05 -0.04 
Week 14      
Week 15    0.18 0.18 
Week 16    -0.15 -0.13 
Week 17    0.03 0.02 
Week 18 (post)    -0.39 -0.45 
Week 19 (post)    0.00 -0.11 
Week 20 (post)    0.15 0.08 




Appendix E. Penalties per Week as Dependent Variable and Number of Fines 




Appendix F. Penalties per Week as Dependent Variable and Monetary Amount of Fines 
(OLS, Betas Reported) 
Previous Penalties 0.07*** 
Previous Monetary Amount of Fines -0.00009*** 
Games Per Week 14.38*** 
  
F Statistic 766.7 
Prob >F 0.00 
R-Squared 0.90 
*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001 
 
  
Previous Penalties 0.07*** 
Previous Fines -1.34*** 
Games Per Week 14.41*** 
  
F Statistic 766.76 
Prob >F 0.00 
R-Squared 0.90 
*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001  
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Appendix G. Dependent Variable Descriptives 
       
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max  
Average Penalties per Game 273 14.18 2.36 6.25 24.00  
Average Violent Penalties per Game 273 2.25 0.71 0.00 7.00  
Penalties per Week 273 183.41 78.17 8.00 318.00  
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